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Proposals for Quantum causal models have tended to favour a mechanistic view, according to
which classical causal graphs should be replaced by some notion of ‘quantum processes’. Here we
define an alternative framework that does not implicate any underlying ‘mechanism’, but rather
views causality as a relation between an observer’s probability assignments to counterfactual exper-
iments. Our framework is based on the assumption of causal sufficiency: that it should be possible
to make inferences about interventions using only the probabilities from a single ‘reference exper-
iment’ plus causal structure in the form of a DAG. This leads to several interesting results: we
find that quantum measurements deserve a special status distinct from interventions, and that a
special rule is needed for making inferences about what would happen if they are not performed
(‘un-measurements’). This rule is found to be the ‘Urgleiching’ already discovered by the QBist
interpretation of quantum mechanics. We find that the causal structure of quantum systems must
have a ‘layered’ structure, and that the model can naturally be made symmetric under reversal of
the causal arrows. We argue that these results are compatible with the hypothesis that the direction
of causality is observer-dependent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason [...][is] to resolve the many particular effects
into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to
the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery [...]. Thus the observation of
human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our
endeavours to elude or avoid it.”
— David Hume, ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’
3Humans have a powerful intuitive understanding of causality that precedes modern science. Historically, the primary
role of causality was sociological and not physical: it was a way of assigning blame. As such, it was closely tied to
the idea of agency : the power (possessed only by Gods, people and animals) to make things happen and thereby be
blamed for the consequences. After the Enlightenment, the role of causality changed and causal powers began to be
attributed to inanimate objects. In the Epilogue of Causality [1], Judea Pearl argues that this change was a direct
result of technological progress. When a tree breaks or a stone shatters, we could continue to blame it on the Gods,
but when a catapult or a wagon breaks it is much more useful (for the purpose of fixing it) to blame a frayed rope
or a faulty wheel. This attribution of causal powers to inanimate matter led to the modern idea that causal relations
are physical properties of things, i.e. that things have causal powers not by vitue of having agency, as humans do, but
simply by virtue of being made up of physical matter. In this way, the historically anthropocentric idea of causality
has been externalized and objectified by scientists – some even go as far as to claim that it is the very goal of science
to uncover the causal relations that exist (independently of us) in the world.
The arrival of information theory and quantum mechanics in the 20th century has introduced a new facet to this
problem. It has become apparent that there is a sense in which physical systems (i.e. not necessarily human or
conscious) can be said to perform observations. In quantum interference experiments, such as Young’s double-slit, the
visibility of interference fringes is found to degrade not just from human observation but from the mere availablility
of information about which path the particle took through the interferometer. In this way, the emphasis has shifted
from ‘observation’ to ‘information’, and indeed the very act of observation itself has been broadened to include not
just humans but any system capable of obtaining and storing information about another system through a physical
interaction. Throughout this work, we will remain as ambivalent as possible about whether an ‘observer’ refers to
a conscious agent, or whether it is merely a physical system acting as an observer in the broader sense of being an
acquirer of information.
Alongside these developments, more recently the sciences have expanded their formal notion of causality beyond
deterministic definitions to include the notion of probabilistic causation, following seminal developments in statistical
modeling [1, 2]. A key part of this new notion of causality is the concept of an intervention by an external agent,
which is usually assumed to be a human experimenter, but which may be extended to include physical systems, as in
so-called ‘natural experiments’, provided certain conditions are met [3].
Taken together, these developments breathe new life into an old question regarding the status of causal relations,
namely, whether they represent physical mechanisms intrinsic to the system (thus entirely independent of observation)
or whether they represent a property of the system relative to the observer, that is, they can only be defined once
certain physical properties of the ‘observing system’ are also defined. In what follows, we will call the first view causal
realism and the second causal relativism.
The present work aims to contribute to understanding of this question within the context of quantum systems
specifically, and using the models of probabilistic causation described in the textbooks of Refs. [1–3]. These models
are based on the idea that causality tells us how the probability of an event would change if a special kind of
manipulation called an intervention were be performed on it, and is variously known as ‘manipulationist causality’
(by philosophers), ‘Bayesian networks’ (by statisticians), or simply ‘causal modeling’, which is the term we will use.
Causal models are relevant to the main question of the present work because of numerous recent attempts to
generalize these models to quantum mechanics. One thing that is striking about these various attempts is that they
either fail to provide any guidance as to the nature of causal relations (i.e. as to whether they are intrinsic to the
system or dependent on a physical observer) or else they implicitly favour the view that causal relations are entirely
intrinsic to the system. The alternative possibility – that causal relations are to some extent observer dependent –
has been neither contradicted nor explored in the physics literature to date. The present paper aims to fill that gap.
Although this paper is chiefly aimed at an audience familiar with work on quantum causal models, the presentation
of the material here is quite different to what is normally found in textbooks. Some results, while standard, may
therefore appear in a new light, and so readers already familiar with the topic are nevertheless encouraged not
to skip the earlier sections of the paper. The outline of the paper is as follows. Sec. I A contains an overview
of different approaches to quantum causality in the literature, emphasizing aspects that are relevant to this work.
Sec. I B elaborates on the difference between the causal realist and causal relativist points of view and presents
some arguments in favour of causal relativism. Sec. II presents a general framework for causal modelling that is
motivated by the relativist interpretation. It defines causality in terms of the probabilities that an observer would
assign to counterfactual experiments in which they contemplate manipulating certain variables. Sec. III then reviews
the standard definitions of causal modeling found in Refs. [1, 2], but re-interpreted so as to fit within our general
framework. Chapter IV is the main contribution of this work, concerned with how to construct a quantum causal
model that meets the demands of a causal relativist. We first discuss the various challenges to quantum causal models
in Sec. IV A 2 and Sec. IV A 3. We argue that quantum causal models must include a new type of manipulation
besides interventions, called ‘un-measurements’, in which the observer elects to not perform a measurement as a
means of probing the causal structure. In Sec. IV B we show how a result taken from the literature on QBism enables
4us to define such an ‘un-measurement’. This motivates a new definition of the ‘Markov conditions’ appropriate to
quantum systems, described in Sec. IV D and generalized in Sec. IV E, and we show how these can naturally be
made to be causally symmetric. In Sec. IV F we consider causal inference in quantum causal models: Sec. IV F 1
generalizes un-measurements to arbitrary causal structures, while Sec. IV F 2 exposes a fundamental problem for
the relativist interpretation in making inferences about interventions. We show that a solution can be obtained by
imposing special conditions on the form of the causal structure. Finally, Sec. V B elaborates on the implications of
the model’s symmetry under causal inversion and its relation to the causal arrow of time.
A. Quantum Causality: the view from physics
We scientists have generally not troubled ourselves with the philosophical meaning of causality because it turns out
that the most salient features of causality can be widely agreed upon without recourse to metaphysics. In particular,
it is generally agreed (at least among physicists) that causation is transitive: if A causes B and B causes C, then A
must cause C (in this case A is called an ‘indirect’ cause of C). Furthermore, it stands to reason that no cause can
be its own effect, hence there can be no chain of causes leading from A back to itself. Based on these axioms, the
causal relations among a set of propositions A,B,C, ... can be represented schematically by a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) (see Fig.1). In this representation, a variable A is a cause of B iff there is at least one path leading from A to
B following the directions of the arrows. It is also standard to use the additional terminology that A is a direct cause
B if there is a single arrow from A to B, and an indirect cause if there is a path consisting of two or more arrows
from A to B. These special cases do not exclude each other, thus A can be both a direct and indirect cause of B.
Note that while cause is a transitive notion, the more refined notion of direct cause is not transitive.
FIG. 1. An example of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing causal relations among causal relata A,B,C. Here, the
variable A is both a direct cause of C and an indirect cause of C via the variable B.
(Note: We will often use ‘family tree’ terminology to describe relationships in a DAG, eg. in addition to the parents
of X, one can define its children, ancestors and descendants in an analogous way. We will also call A a cause of B
whenever A is an ancestor of B, irrespective of whether it is also a parent of B).
Beyond these basic axioms, there still remains ample flexibility in the physical meaning of causality. For example,
some accounts of causality are necessarily deterministic, while others are probabilistic or counterfactual; an overview
of different metaphysical conceptions of causality can be found in Ref. [4]. Within the applied sciences that use
causal notions to make predictions and diagnoses (such as the social and biomedical sciences, economics and artificial
intelligence research), the dominant paradigm of causal modeling is the probabilistic, manipulationist account of
causality as described in the textbooks of (among others) Pearl [1] and Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines [2]. These scientific
models of causality are surprisingly different from the models commonly found in the philosophical literature. Two
key features distinguish these causal models from other approaches. The first is that causal relations are supposed to
hold between variables rather than particular events. The second is that causal models do not provide an exhaustive
definition of causality (as philosophers tend to aim for): they simply tell us how certain causal propositions which are
in doubt may be ascertained from other causal propositions that are presumed to be already known [3, 5].
In causal models a direct cause from variable A to variable B is understood to mean that different ‘manipulations’
of the variable A change the conditional probability of B given the manipulated value of A. Different approaches give
somewhat different definitions of this relation, as well as varying accounts of what constitutes a ‘manipulation’. Even
when no variables have been manipulated, it is assumed that the observed probabilities of the variables in a system
must be constrained somehow by their causal structure. This constraint in causal models is given by a postulate
called the ‘Causal Markov Condition (CMC)’, which acts as the glue that binds probabilities to causal structure.
In one of its simplest forms, the CMC reduces to the intuitive postulate that variables cannot be correlated unless
one is a cause of the other, or they share a common cause. This instance of the CMC is also called Reichenbach’s
Principle of Common Causes, though the latter has several variants that must be carefully distinguished, as we will
see in Sec. III A.
5By linking probabilities to causal structure, the CMC provides us with a notion of possible explanation, namely,
given a probability distribution P (X) on a set of variables X, a causal graph G(X) is a possible explanation of P (X)
only if P (X) satisfies the constraints of the CMC as determined by the causal structure of G(X). Assuming this
requirement is met, the pair {P (X), G(X)} defines a causal model. Remarkably, it contains all the information that
is needed to predict how the conditional probabilities would change under manipulations (more specifically, under
certain idealized manipulations called interventions) on any of the variables in X. We will elevate this property to
a general postulate that we call causal sufficiency in Sec. II, as it will be a useful guide when we consider causal
modeling of quantum systems.
The justification of the CMC is deeply tied to assumptions about the physics of the underlying systems. Moreover
these assumptions, although evidently plausible in the classical domain, must be re-evaluated when we pass to the
quantum domain. The primary way in which the CMC appears to fail for quantum systems is that some correlations
that can be produced by quantum entanglement apparently do not conform to the principle of factorization on common
causes (a subsidiary of Reichenbach’s Principle), as we will discuss in Sec. IV A 3. Yet, without this principle, the
CMC no longer seems able to perform an important role, namely, that of supplying the bounds on the strength
of correlations between variables sharing a common cause, in the form of Bell inequality constraints. For quantum
systems there appears to be no analogous causal principle that would directly provide the known constraints on
quantum probabilities – the so-called ‘quantum bounds’. Researchers attempting to construct a causal model for
quantum systems are therefore faced with the awkward question of what should replace the CMC.
A route commonly taken in the physics literature, exemplified by the frameworks of Generalized Probabilistic
Theories (GPTs) [6] and process theories[7, 8], is to deny that causality plays any role in defining the bounds on
correlations, and instead restrict its function to indicating the allowed pathways along which information can travel.
According to this approach, any sort of correlations – including those that exceed the quantum limits – may qualify
as being causal provided that information only travels along the pathways indicated by the causal structure (more
formally, the model should have ‘no-signalling from the future’, also known as terminality [7]). Under this view, causal
structure serves merely as a kind of skeleton that can be dressed in the formal apparatus of whatever physical theory
one wishes to consider, whether it be classical, quantum, or some other general theory. Outside of classical theory,
one is free to simply shed the quantitative part of Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Causes (i.e. the part that
pertains to the factorization of correlations) without feeling that anything has been lost in the meaning of causality.
There is another, closely related class of approaches in the literature that I refer to loosely as quantum process
approaches to causality. These approaches treat causality as a property of a generalized quantum process, usually
conceived of as a complex matrix or operator, which acts as a kind of fixed mapping that takes a set of observations
as inputs (possibly by multiple observers) and produces a joint probability for the outcomes that is consistent with
quantum mechanics. Examples of such approaches include quantum combs [9, 10], process tensors [11, 12], process
matrices [13–15], quantum cause-effect conditionals [16] and many more besides. It has been emphasized that these
approaches can be unified within a single ‘container theory’ that captures the essential features of all of them [17].
Both the GPT approaches and the quantum process approaches emphasize a single mathematical construct (the
‘process’) that is fixed independently of the choice of observations, and serves merely to produce responses to whatever
actions the observers take. As such, these approaches lend themselves to interpretations that give ontological meaning
to processes. This is fine for the causal realist who can simply identify causality as the structure of the ontological
processes. Given the large portion of the literature that is encompassed by the GPT and quantum process approaches
to quantum causality, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the dominant trend in quantum causal modeling
favours the view of the causal realist.
Despite being ‘favourable’ to a realist interpretation, most of the aforementioned approaches are motivated by purely
operationalist considerations, and do not seek out a deeper meaning for causality, beyond its practical consequences
for the conveyance of information from one place to another. Models of quantum causality that go beyond the shallow
operational approach are rare. One notable exception is the quantum causal model proposed by Allen et. al. [18],
which connects causality to the deeper principle of an underlying unitary dynamics. Similarly to classical derivations
of the CMC from underlying determinism, Allen et. al. used unitarity to obtain new quantitative constraints on the
form of quantum processes, leading to a quantum version of the CMC. However, as with the generalized quantum
network approaches mentioned above, their constraints referred not to probabilities but to a generalized network of
quantum processes, presented as an essentially observer-independent structure.
Contrary to this trend, a causal relativist can no more accept the notion of an observer-independent process than
they can accept the idea of an observer-independent quantum state. For the relativist, the mathematical objects
of quantum theory, including its states and processes, do not directly represent a reality external to observers, but
rather they describe the different ways that reality can manifest itself to different observers. In particular, the relativist
emphasizes that there is no such thing as a state or process that describes a ‘view from nowhere’ – every meaningful
quantum object is described in relation to some implicit observer, and mode of observation. The goal of the relativist
is to make this implicit dependence explicit, and to show how the viewpoints of different observers are related by
6strict rules. The relativist therefore emphasizes the probabilities that an observer should assign to events relative to
their own standpoint, and seeks to derive laws of rational consistency that connect the different possible standpoints
of observation.
Is there any quantum causal model that goes beyond mere operationalism, but which adheres to the view of the
causal relativist? In this paper, we will describe the challenges facing such a model, and ultimately give a tentative
answer in the affirmative. Before starting on this journey, in the next section we elaborate on what exactly differen-
tiates the causal relativist from the causal realist, and emphasizes the importance of probabilities and counterfactual
reasoning for the relativist.
B. Causality: intrinsic or relative?
Despite being in popular usage for decades by practitioners in the sciences and humanities, manipulationist causal
models have only recently begun to be taken seriously by philosophers. The text Making Things Happen: A Theory of
Causal Explanation by James Woodward (Ref. [3]) contains an illuminating account of manipulationist causal models
based on a counterfactual interpretation. The model of quantum causality presented here owes much to Woodward’s
explication of classical causal models in terms of counterfactuals. However, I adopt a philosophical position not quite
aligned with the one that Woodward endorses, preferring instead something closer (but not identical) to the account of
causality promoted by Price [19], which sits more comfortably with the relativist viewpoint. The distinction between
these two philosophical points of view is discussed below.
At the beginning of the Introduction, the question was posed whether causal relations are things that exist inde-
pendently of observing systems or ‘agents’, or whether there is an observer-dependent component to causality. In the
context of manipulationist accounts of causality, there are two main competing views: that of the causal realist, who
sees causal relations as entirely present in the system, and the causal relativist, who sees cause and effect as being
defined only relative to a suitably defined observer. These distinct viewpoints are described below.
Causal realist: The fact that we observe cause and effect relationships between things is contingent on the
existence of a causal mechanism that exists between these things in the external world independently of observers.
Consider, for instance, the following passage from Pearl [1] (emphasis in original):
“[...] causal relationships are ontological, describing objective physical constraints in our world, whereas
probabilistic relationships are epistemic, reflecting what we know or believe about the world”.
According to the causal realist, causal relations refer to mechanisms or causal structures whose orientation and
operation stand independently of any observer, human or otherwise (Note that such ontological mechanisms, if they
exist, are time-asymmetric and hence represent a supplementary structure that is added to or superimposed upon the
usual time-reversible laws of physics; see Price [19]).
The causal relativist, on the other hand, does not consider causal structure as being entirely a feature of the system,
but rather as a product of the interaction between an observer and the system, and in particular, as dependent on
the observer’s perceptual apparatus:
Causal relativist: Causal relations are not entirely features of the external world, but their properties depend
on how we, as agents or observing systems, acquire information about the world. That is, the cause-effect relation is
not a feature of a mechanism that exists externally to us, but rather is a feature of the process of ‘observation’ itself.
(Whether this ‘observation’ process is supposed to be of a physical or a psychological character is here left open to
interpretation).
(Note: Our contrasting of the modifiers ‘realist’ and ‘relativist’ is an unfortunate accident of our choice of terminol-
ogy. We do not mean to suggest that the relativist is in any way committed to being an anti-realist about causality.
We only wish to convey that the relativist’s notion of causality relies – somehow – on the observer).
How do these views compare in light of the present aim of constructing a manipulationist model of causality that
can account for quantum systems?
The causal realist locates causality in physical processes given by themselves. For him, the statement ‘A causes B’
is an intrinsic property of some existent mechanism or object, and as such it retains its meaning without the need to
be compared to any other object of reference, or the need to be ‘observed’ by some observer or agent.
On the other hand, the causal relativist interprets the statement ‘A causes B’ as expressing a statement about
the expected experience (that is, probability assignments) of some observer, namely, it is a statement about what
this observer expects to happen to B if they were to perform a manipulation of A. Importantly, this point of view
7ties causality directly to counterfactual statements about probabilities, i.e. ‘A causes B’ is a statement about the
probability for B to take different values in the counterfactual circumstance that the observer manipulates A (this will
be formalized shortly in Sec. III).
(Note: In this work we follow the QBists in always referring probabilities to the expectations of some observer. We
do not subscribe to a propensity or objective interpretation of probability, because that would undermine our whole
project of trying to relativise causality to the observer. However, unlike the QBists, we do not here exclude the idea
that the ‘observer’ might be interpretable as a kind of physical system, provided one is able to make sense of what it
might mean for a physical system to have ‘probability assignments’ about its future interactions with other systems.
The reader inclined to this point of view is invited to fill in the details for themselves).
It is important to note that although the relativist approach leads naturally to interpreting causality as a relation
between counterfactuals, the converse does not hold: a counterfactual reading of causality does not force one to
be a causal relativist. This is simply because the counterfactuals in question need not refer to the expectations
of an observer, but rather might refer to certain objective alternative states of the world, having certain ‘objective
probabilities’ that have meaning even when no observer is around. Woodward [3] is one advocate of such a view. He
writes:
“[...] if it is possible to change Y by intervening on X, then there must be an independently existing,
invariant relationship between X and Y that the agent makes use of when she changes X and, in doing
so, changes Y – a relationship that would exist and have whatever characteristics it has even if the agent
were unable to manipulate X or chose not to manipulate X or did not exist” [3] .
Woodward even goes further, arguing that the relativist view is untenable for any plausible counterfactual ma-
nipulationist account of causality. The main thrust of Woodward’s argument is that there seems to be something
undeniably objective about causal statements (modulo certain background assumptions). Woodward gives the exam-
ple of stepping in front of a speeding bus: the question of whether this would cause him to be injured hardly seems
to be a matter of convention or subjective beliefs, but has rather more the character of a brute fact.
A detailed reply to Woodward’s arguments can be found in Refs. [19, 20]. The reply rests on making a careful
distinction between two distinct notions of objectivity. One notion is that a causal relation is objective if it holds
true absolutely. The other notion is that a causal relation is objective if it holds true for a sufficiently large class of
observers including ourselves. The latter notion of objectivity might be called relative objectivity. Unlike the causal
realist, who insists that causal relations are absolutely objective, the relativist only concedes objectivity in the relative
sense. Note, however, that this is still a very strong notion of objectivity.
In the case of Woodward and the speeding bus, a relativist might be willing to grant that there is an absolutely
objective correlation between Woodward’s initial position X (sidewalk or road) and his final state Y (healthy or
injured). This correlation is merely indicative of a possible causal relation, but it tells us nothing of the direction of
causality, and the objectivity of the latter can be argued to be merely of the relative kind.
The meaning of the statement that X causes Y is, on a manipulationist account, that the correlation is maintained
when X is manipulated but disappears when Y is manipulated. The question, therefore, is whether this asymmetry is
entirely a dormant property of the system that is simply revealed by the manipulation (the realist view), or whether
it is introduced somehow through the physical act of ‘manipulation’ by an observer (the relativist view). On further
reflection, the asymmetry can be traced to the fact that, in our experience, our future actions cannot affect what
has already happened in our past. This fact is not built-in to the apparatus of the fundamental laws of physics: the
orientation of the time-axis is something that we put in by hand, choosing it to match with the direction of time that
we experience, eg. with the direction of thermodynamic time in our laboratory.
Yet, supposing for simplicity the laws of physics to be classical and deterministic, there is no reason to exclude the
possibility that matter in some far-off corner of the universe might have a thermodynamic time that runs contrary to
ours. Intelligent beings in that part of the universe would label the time axis opposite to our own labeling. Perhaps
among them would be a philosopher, let us call him Anti-Woodward, who would consider stepping in front of a
speeding bus so as to prove a point. From our point of view, however, the event of Anti-Woodward’s being injured
or not precedes (in our time) the event of his stepping (or not) in front of the bus. We would therefore be tempted
to conclude that we could in principle make Woodward step or not step in front of the bus at a later time by fixing
the initial (in our time) conditions so as to have him either injured or not injured; the deterministic laws of physics
would simply bring about the former state of affairs from the latter, just as easily as they did in the more natural
direction. Perhaps it would seem strange to us to see the events unfolding in this order, with the direction of causal
influence running contrary to the thermodynamic arrow of the subjects involved, but it is no more (or less) strange
than the fact that the atoms of a scrambled egg, if deliberately arranged into just the right ‘scrambled’ initial state,
could be made to evolve deterministically into a whole unbroken egg.
The relativist therefore suggests that at least the direction of a causal influence is a property that depends on the
observer, and that a system in isolation need not have any intrinsic temporal directionality associated with it, as the
8causal realist would wish.
Beyond the direction of causality, it is worth mentioning that at least some observer-dependence is inevitable in
asserting the existence of causal relations (as Woodward readily admits), simply because it must first be decided
which alternative possibilities are to be seriously considered, and this clearly depends on what is considered possible
or impossible for the observer or group of observers in question. For example, the possibility of a gas leak in an
apartment is a legitimate possible cause of a fire, whereas the presence of oxygen in the room at the time is not
considered a contributing cause, because the possibility of its not being present is not seriously considered. This is
conventional, insofar as it depends on the circumstantial fact that we have no practical ability to remove the oxygen.
If the air in the apartment could plausibly be drained at the push of a button, then it would become a contributing
cause. It is therefore a point of agreement between the realist and the relativist that any meaningful causal claim must
be grounded in some background assumption about what is “seriously possible”, and causal claims are only objective
insofar as observers can agree on this. But what constrains what an observer considers to be a ‘serious possibility’?
The realist would say that nature determines the serious possibilities and their likelihoods, and our disagreements as
to what these are only reflects the limits in our understanding of nature. For the relativist, on the other hand, the
serious possibilities are to be understood in relation to the observer. The relativist frames the question as: ‘what are
the serious possibilities for this or that observer’, and the observer’s own physical make-up and situation must be taken
into account in deciding what their causal powers are. Contrary to the realist, the relativist embraces the idea that
different observers may have different causal powers, by virtue of their different relative positions and compositions.
Of course, the relativist must then answer as to precisely what properties of the observer are relevant to their causal
powers, a deep and fascinating problem that is beyond the scope of this work.
II. CAUSAL MODELLING: KEY CONCEPTS
In this section, I will describe a general framework for causal modelling that applies to any class of physical systems,
and which emphasizes a counterfactual definition of causality, in order to accommodate the causal relativist viewpoint.
A. Notation
Following the literature, P (X) represents a normalized function {P (X = x) : x ∈ domX} from discrete elements x
(the values in the domain of the random variable X) to positive probabilities P (X = x) ∈ (0, 1]. In the present work,
when evaluating functions at specific values, I adopt the shorthand P (x) := P (X = x). Thus, for example,∑
y
P (X, y,w|Z) := {
∑
y∈domY
P (X = x, Y = y,W = w|Z = z) : x ∈ domX, z ∈ domZ} (1)
represents a function of two variables X,Z (since W is fixed to the value w and the values of Y are summed over).
Later on it will also be useful to consider functions of the form ρ(X) := {ρ(x) : x ∈ domX} where each ρ(x) is
a linear operator (in this case a density operator) on a Hilbert space H. As an example, let ρ(A) be a density
operator valued function of the variable A, and let EB be a linear operator valued function of the variable B such that
{Eb : b ∈ domB} is a POVM. Then the probabilities for obtaining the outcome B = b for all b ∈ domB conditional
on the state preparation corresponding to a specific value A = a can be written in shorthand as:
P (B|a) = Tr [ρ(a)EB ] (2)
instead of the more laborious
{P (B = b|A = a) : b ∈ domB} = {Tr [ρ(a)Eb] : b ∈ domB} . (3)
For sets of random variables, I will often replace the ‘∪’ with just a comma when taking the union, eg. A,B,C :=
A ∪ B ∪ C. Set of random variables can be used to define composite random variables, denoted by bold letters, eg.
the composite variable X := A,B takes values x := {a, b} in the domain domX := domA× domB.
B. Causality and measurements
Following the causal relativist, we wish to define causal influence in terms of an observer’s manipulations of the
physical variables in a system. To this end, we adopt the following definition.
9CC. Counterfactual Causation: Let A,B be random variables. Then the statement ‘A causes B’ means that if
we were to perform a special action called an active manipulation of A, we would find that our choice of manipulation
of A is correlated with the value of B. Formally, we introduce a control variable CA (where the superscript indicates
that it is a manipulation of A) whose values c ∈ domC represent the different choices of manipulation. Then ‘A
causes B’ expresses that different values of CA correspond to different conditional distributions of B:
P (B|CA = c ) 6= P (B|CA = c′ ), for some c 6= c′ ∈ dom(C). (4)
In this instance, we call A the cause and B the effect.
This definition is rather more general than what one usually finds in textbooks, where the manipulation CA is
replaced by an intervention on A, and the choices of manipulation are interpreted as different values of A. Our more
general construction has one key advantage over the traditional approach, which is that it liberates the concept of
causality from the overly restrictive concept of intervention and allows us to consider other kinds of active manipula-
tions through which causal relations become manifest. In particular it extends to quantum measurements, which we
will later see are capable of revealing causal relations, despite being quite different to traditional interventions.
Note that the definition CC depends on the concept of an active manipulation. We can interpret CC as defining a
causal relation between A and B to be that extra information that is needed to determine what happens (probabilisti-
cally) when one or the other variable is actively manipulated by the observer. Aside from active manipulations, there
exists another mode of observation, familiar to us in the classical domain, that we call passive observation, which
is not sufficient to fully determine the causal relations (though one can sometimes make deductions about causal
structure purely from correlations). One of the duties of a causal model is to give a formal characterisation of these
two distinct modes of data acquisition, especially the active manipulations; this will be done shortly in Sec. III B.
As we will see later, it may also be useful to consider other modes of observation besides these two, but that will be
deferred to Sec. IV.
In causal modeling, the causal relata are a set of localized measurements that are performed on some external
arrangement of physical matter evolving in time for the duration of an experiment; this material is referred to simply
as the system. These measurements are assumed to be fixed in advance of the experiment and cannot be dynamically
changed as the experiment progresses. We now specify more carefully what we mean by ‘measurements’:
Localized Measurement: A localized measurement is a physical interaction of an observer with a system that
takes place within a region of space-time that is localized relative to the experiment, and produces an outcome (i.e.
a piece of classical data). Here, localized means that the space-time extent of each region is small compared to the
sizes of the distances and times between the measurements in the experiment under consideration. (This is a slight
generalization of the similar concept of a space-time random variable introduced in Ref. [21], where the regions were
assumed to be point-like).
Remark: The space-time co-ordinates of each measurement region are only given relative to the experimental
instance or run. Thus, if we consider the whole ensemble of repetitions of the experiment (whether parallel in space or
sequential in time), then strictly speaking each measurement actually corresponds to a whole set of disjoint space-time
regions, each one corresponding to a unique experimental run. The important thing is that the space-time region of
a given measurement has the same co-ordinates in each run, relative to the lab frame.
Each measurement is associated with a random variable Xi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} whose values xi ∈ domXi correspond
to the possible outcomes of the measurement, with P (Xi = xi) the probability of obtaining the outcome xi. It is
conventional to choose the labelling such that i < i′ whenever Xi is a cause of Xi′ . Note that under this definition, all
random variables represent the ‘outcomes’ of measurements, even in cases where the value of a variable is completely
determined. For instance, the action of a scientist turning a dial to some chosen value is still considered a ‘localized
physical action on a system that produces an outcome’. We thus avoid making any fundamental distinction between
‘settings’ and ‘outcomes’ as is typical elsewhere in the literature. Instead, we treat all variables as ‘outcomes’, and
instead make the distinction between passive observations and active manipulations as mentioned above. Given
definitions of these two modes of measurement, we can define two different types of experiments:
Observational Scheme: An experiment in which all data is acquired by passive observations;
Manipulationist Scheme: An experiment in which at least some data is acquired by active manipulation.
The concept of an experiment will be further refined in the following section.
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C. Experiments and counterfactual inference
Although we often make reference to the ‘system’, it is rather the concept of an experiment that is more important,
because it is only through experimentation that the properties of the system become known to us. The system plays
only a secondary role as an abstraction that serves to represent the object to which our (the observer’s) measurements
are directed.
Experiment: An experiment consists of multiple repetitions of two fundamental steps:
(1). The preparation step in which a system of the desired type is identified, isolated inside the laboratory, and
‘cleaned up’ to meet certain quality standards;
(2). The measurement step in which the set of localized measurements X := {Xi : i = 1, 2, ..., N} is performed,
always in the same way and with each measurement occurring within its designated region of space-time.
It is important to emphasize that an observer is implicit in every experiment, through the reference to measurements,
which presuppose an observer. This will be relevant in Sec. III A, where it will motivate us to interpret the Causal
Markov Condition as a defining postulate, rather than a derivative property, of classical stochastic systems.
The system becomes known to the observer only through many runs of an experiment performed upon the same
type of system, using the same preparation and the same measurements. From the collected data-set of outcomes,
the observer may infer a joint probability distribution P (X); this will be called the system’s behaviour relative to the
given experiment.
Since the behaviour P (X) is going to be the work-horse of all that is to follow, it is important to consider only
experiments which meet certain rigorous standards, in order to ensure that P (X) contains as much useful information
as possible. The following includes the most important features that are typically assumed to hold in any experiment
(We do not attempt to justify these assumptions; their usefulness will become evident in application):
Key properties of experiments:
(i). Distinct measured variables should refer to logically distinct properties (eg. ‘number of ravens’ R and ‘number
of birds’ B are not logically distinct, and so must not both be used in the same experiment);
(ii). The measured variables should be causally sufficient, which means that if X and Y are judged relevant to the
system of interest, than any common cause of X and Y is also relevant and must be measured (or included as an
unmeasured latent variable – see below);
(iii). Each measurement X should be maximally fine-grained, that is, there should be no other measurement X ′ such
that performing X is equivalent to performing X ′ and then discarding some information about the outcome of X ′.
(iv). If the experiment has a chance of failure, care must be taken not to introduce spurious correlations in P (X)
when post-selecting on the successful runs. (One method to avoid this is simply to enlarge the scope of the experiment
to explicitly include its ‘failure modes’ as a special class of possible outcomes).
(v). The exogenous variables – those whose causes (if they have any) are judged to lie outside of the system of
interest – must be initialized or selected statistically independently of one another, i.e. P (E1, E2) = P (E1)P (E2)
whenever E1, E2 are exogenous.
Causal relations are relevant to experiments because they enable us to make inferences about counterfactuals.
Specifically, we define counterfactual inference as the procedure of taking a certain experiment as a reference point
and using the system’s behaviour in this reference experiment to deduce what would happen in a whole family of
similar but distinct experiments. This deduction is carried out by postulating certain rules, called inference rules,
that relate the observations in the reference experiment to one’s expectations about what would happen in any of
the contemplated alternative experiments (hereafter called the counterfactual experiments). We will restrict ourselves
to the set of counterfactual experiments in which one performs active manipulations of some subset of variables
in the reference experiment, i.e. to manipulationist schemes. Note that there is no a priori requirement that the
measurements in the reference experiment should be passive observations – they may also represent some kind of
active manipulations. Later we will see that for classical systems the reference experiment is an obsevational scheme,
while for quantum systems it arguably is not (but see discussion in Sec. IV A 2).
In general it is not possible to make inferences about the counterfactual experiments from the reference experiment
alone; some additional information is required. Since the inferences we are concerned with are about what would
happen under active manipulations, the definition of counterfactual causation suggests that the additional information
takes the form of causal structure. To formalize this idea, we introduce the following definition:
CM. Causal model: Let P (X) represent data about a system obtained in the reference experiment, and let G(X)
11
be a DAG that represents the (actual or hypothesized) causal structure of the system. Then the pair {P (X), G(X)}
defines a causal model for the system.
This definition is justified by the following postulate, which generalizes CC to arbitrary causal structures:
CS. Causal sufficiency: Causal structure is sufficient for counterfactual inference. That is, given a causal model
{P (X), G(X)} for a system in an experiment, there exist inference rules that can be used to deduce from this model
what would happen in any counterfactual experiment involving active manipulations on the system.
The definition CM and the postulate CS are the core of causal modeling. However, as stated, they are still very
vague. There remain two details that must be specified in order to obtain a rigorous framework for causal modeling.
The first is to specify exactly what conditions the pair {P (X), G(X)} needs to satisfy in order that we can say that
G(X) represents the “actual or hypothesized causal structure” of the system. Obviously, not all causal structures will
be appropriate for a given experiment and behaviour P (X). The second important detail is what precisely are the
inference rules referred to in CS. In the remainder of this section, we will address both of these questions in a manner
that is sufficiently general to encompass any class of physical systems, whether classical, quantum, or otherwise. Later
in Sec. III we will specialize to classical systems, from which we will recover the familiar framework of classical causal
modeling found in textbooks, and then in Sec. IV we will discuss how causal modeling of quantum systems may be
included within the same overarching framework presented here.
D. Physical Markov conditions
Once we have fixed a convention for the reference experiment, it is useful for the purposes of inference to restrict
our attention to some particular class of physical systems, which can be broadly or narrowly defined. For example
one could restrict attention to the narrow class of classical pendulums, or to the broader class of relativistic N -body
mechanical systems, etc. Suppose that we gather statistics from the reference experiment performed on many different
systems, all taken from the particular class of physical systems under consideration. Now, depending on the particular
features of this class, one will find that certain conditions always hold between the variables in the reference experiment
that depend explicitly on the causal structure G(X).
One condition that is natural and commonplace for many classes of physical systems is the condition that causation
implies correlation, i.e. that if the variables A,B are found to be uncorrelated in the reference experiment then neither
will be found to be a cause of the other under manipulations of either variable. Yet it must be recognized that even
this intuitive connection between correlation and causation is not guaranteed in all cases, but is contingent on the
properties of the class of systems under study. For example, suppose we are concerned only with transformations of
a single computational bit, with the following restriction on the dynamics: at the ith time-step, the value of the bit
Vi is equal to its value at the previous time-step, Vi−1, summed (modulo 2) with a uniformly distributed random
bit Ri−1 assumed to be uncorrelated across time steps. Let us take the reference experiment to be simply a read-
out at each time-step of the bits Vi, Ri without disturbing them. Now it is clear that Vi−1 causes Vi, since active
manipulations of the former would result in changes to the value of the latter; nevertheless the variables Vi−1 and
Vi are uncorrelated in the reference experiment, due to the confounding influence of the random bit Ri−1. Thus we
have a situation where two statistically independent bits are nevertheless causally connected, violating the condition
‘causation implies correlation’. Of course, one might object that this example is highly contrived, but the general idea
– that different conditions hold for different classes of physical systems – carries over to more realistic examples. In
general we will use the term physical Markov condition to describe any rule, such as ‘causation implies correlation’,
that relates causal structure of a system from a particular class of physical systems to the statistics observed in the
reference experiment.
To see why physical Markov conditions play a central role in causal modeling, consider the class of deterministic
systems, defined by the property that the value of each variable Xi is fully determined by the values of its parents
pa(Xi). For such systems, the rule causation implies correlation holds, as does another more interesting condition
[1, 2]:
FCC. Factorization on common causes:
Suppose neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and C is the complete set of their shared ancestors, i.e. C contains
all ‘common causes’ (see Fig. 2(a)); then P (X1X2|C) = P (X1|C)P (X2|C) .
The FCC is a physical Markov condition that has an important consequence: if variables A,B,C are found to
be correlated in the reference experiment, and A,B remain correlated conditional on the value of C, then it may be
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concluded that one of the pair A,B must be a cause of the other, so long as we hold firm in our belief that the system
is of the deterministic class. This illustrates one of the main useful properties of a causal model, which is that it
enables us to perform causal inference. That is, given some knowledge about the particular class of physical systems
under study, one can use the statistics obtained in the reference experiment to make deductions about the causal
structure, without having to actually perform any counterfactual experiments (or, as is more commonly the case in
practice, to reduce the number of counterfactual experiments that one needs to perform in order to establish causal
relations).
Moreover, the usefulness of such physical Markov conditions goes both ways: if we have great confidence in the
causal structure, but are less confident about what class of physical systems we are dealing with, we can leverage the
former to make inferences about the latter. Recalling the above example where A,B remain correlated conditional
on C, let us instead suppose that we are in doubt about whether the system is in the deterministic class. If we
now find independent reasons to believe that there is no causal influence between A,B, for instance, if we find that
manipulating either one produces no change in the probability of the other, then we can use this causal fact to reject
the hypothesis that the system is deterministic, or indeed that it belongs to any class of systems for which the relation
FCC is established. As we will see later on, something like this indeed occurs with quantum systems, and the failure
of the FCC is sometimes taken to be a hallmark of the class of quantum systems.
The most commonly considered class of systems in the literature on causal modeling is the class of classical stochas-
tic systems. This class can be defined as a slight generalization from the class of deterministic systems, as follows:
Classical stochastic systems:
These are systems defined by the requirement that, for every variable Xi relevant to the system, it is possible to
introduce a hypothetical auxiliary variable Ai that is exogenous and has Xi as its only child, such that the value of
Xi is fully determined by the values of its parents pa(Xi) within the system and the value of Ai.
Informally, a classical stochastic system is observationally equivalent to a deterministic system in which there are
hidden local sources of noise at each node (represented by the Ai). This class of systems is particularly interesting
because it has been found to capture a wide range of real physical systems, including biological, ecological, and
mechanical systems, and they form the basis for the standard textbooks on causal inference [1, 2]. Let P (X) be the
observed statistics of the reference experiment for any classical stochastic system with causal structure G(X). Then
the physical Markov conditions for this class of systems are:
CMC. The Causal Markov Condition:
P (X) factorizes according to:
P (X) =
∏
i
P (Xi|pa(Xi)) (5)
where pa(Xi) are the parents (i.e. direct causes) of Xi in G(X);
NFT. No Fine-tuning:
There are no statistical independences in P (X) beyond those that are implied by the Causal Markov Condition for
G(X).
The above physical Markov conditions apply so long as all relevant variables of the system are measured in the
reference experiment. Frequently, it is not practical to measure all of the relevant variables. In such cases, the causal
structure G(X,L) includes latent variables L that do not appear in the observed behaviour P (X). This defines the
strictly larger class of classical stochastic systems with latent variables (in which we can recover the classical stochastic
systems by setting L = ∅). The physical Markov conditions for this class are given by the following (strictly weaker)
conditions:
CMC2. Causal Markov Condition (with latent variables):
There exists an extended distribution P (X,L), such that P (X,L) satisfies the CMC for the causal structure of the
system G(X,L), and P (X) is obtained from P (X,L) by marginalizing over the latent variables, i.e.
P (X) =
∑
l
P (X, l) . (6)
NFT2. No fine-tuning (with latent variables):
There are no statistical independences in the extended distribution P (X,L) beyond those that are implied by CMC2
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for the DAG G(X,L).
The CMC can be derived from the definition of classical stochastic systems [1]. The justification for the no fine-
tuning condition requires an additional assumption that the system of interest is a ‘typical’ member of its class, and
hence is not a member of some special sub-class – such as the deterministic systems – for which additional constraints
might hold. (In more mathematical terms, it can be proven that the set of behaviours that exhibit fine-tuning are a
set of measure zero within the set of all behaviours compatible with a given class of systems [2]). We mention that no
fine-tuning entails causation implies correlation as a corollary, since violation of the latter would imply a statistical
independence between a variable and its parent, which does not follow from the CMC. For the sake of simplicity, we
will assume from here onwards (unless stated otherwise in the text) that there are no latent variables in the systems
of interest.
E. Active manipulations and no-signalling
The details of how to perform counterfactual inference, and in particular the inference rules, will naturally depend
on the precise definition of active manipulation. In order to allow some flexibility in adapting it to different physical
settings, we will remain somewhat vague about its meaning. Nevertheless we can make some definite statements
about its general properties, as follows.
Externality. An active manipulation represents the physical influence on the system by an external entity, which
must itself have no causes within the system, since otherwise it should be included as part of the latter. We leave the
question open as to whether this entity is taken to be just another physical system, or something more special like an
autonomous agent ; in either case it is assumed to affect the system in the same way.
The above assertion introduces what at first sight seems to be a serious problem, namely, that the definition of
active manipulation seems to depend on the definition of a cause (in order to know that the influencing entity has
no causes in the system), but our proposed definition of counterfactual causation is itself based on the notion of
an active manipulation! Fortunately, this is not a vicious circle, for any realistic situation always involves some
causal relations that we postulate a priori, such as an experimenter’s ability to choose which buttons to push on
the apparatus independently of the variables within the measured system. By defining these variables as the active
manipulations we can then usefully apply them to deduce other causal relations that hold within the system. For
practical purposes, therefore, we may leave aside the philosophical debate about how to justify the postulated ‘original
causes’ (the interested reader is referred to [3, 20]).
Secondly, active manipulations on a variable Z can only affect the causal descendants of Z. This is to be expected,
since in our definition of counterfactual causality, the causal descendants of Z are defined as the set of variables which
are affected by manipulations of Z. This is summarized by the principle of ‘counterfactual no-signalling’:
CNS. Counterfactual no-signalling: An active manipulation of Z can only signal to the causal descendants of
Z. Formally, let CZ be a manipulation of Z in a system whose causal relations are described by a DAG G(A,D,R, Z).
Here, A are the causal ancestors of Z, D are the descendants of Z, and R are the remainder. Counterfactual no-
signalling states that:
P (A,R|CZ = c) = P (A,R|CZ = c′) ∀c, c′ ∈ dom(C) . (7)
It is important to note that counterfactual no-signalling is conceptually distinct from another property commonly
referred to as no-signalling in the literature, which states that, within the reference experiment, an exogenous variable
Z (often called a ‘measurement setting’) can only be correlated with its causal descendants. Formally, it can be
expressed as:
NS. No-signalling:
P (R|Z = z) = P (R|Z = z′) , ∀z ∈ dom(Z) , (8)
whenever Z is exogenous, and where R are its non-descendants.
In our framework, NS is derivable from the Causal Markov Condition, whereas CNS is not. Although they
are conceptually distinct, these two versions of the no-signalling principle can be linked by the following rationale.
Since an exogenous variable Z has no causes within the system (i.e. A = ∅), we can, according to externality,
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equally well imagine that it has an external cause given by an active manipulation by a control variable CZ with
dom(CZ) = dom(Z), which fixes its value, and this scenario ought to produce the same statistics. Hence:
P (R|CZ = c) = P (R|Z = c) , ∀c ∈ dom(C) . (9)
By applying counterfactual no-signalling to that equation, we can recover the no-signalling rule. In this sense, the
latter can be thought of as the special case of counterfactual no-signalling applied to exogenous variables.
Beyond externality and counterfactual no-signalling, any further restrictions on the definition of active manipulations
must be specific to the type of experiments and the class of physical systems under consideration.
III. CLASSICAL CAUSAL MODELS AND INFERENCE
In this section, we restrict attention to causal modeling with classical stochastic systems, and assuming no latent
variables. We discuss the origin and characteristics of the physical Markov conditions that hold for these systems,
and we introduce two kinds of measurements: an idealized passive observation called a non-disturbing measurement,
and an idealized active manipulation called an intervention. We show how the latter can be used to derive specific
inference rules for performing counterfactual inference.
A. The Causal Markov Condition
A classical causal model is a causal model designed to model classical stochastic systems. Hence the physical Markov
conditions CMC and NFT tell us how the causal relations of the system constrain the allowed behaviour in the
reference experiment. We then have:
Classical Causal Model:
A Classical Causal Model consists of a pair {P (X), G(X)} where P (X) satisfies the Causal Markov Condition and
no fine-tuning for the DAG G(X).
Why should the CMC be the condition that binds causal structure to probabilities for classical stochastic systems?
There are essentially two ways of establishing this link. The first way is, as we have already mentioned, to start with
the abstract formal definition of classical stochastic systems given in Sec. II D and derive the CMC as a consequence.
The second route inverts this logic: it defines the class of classical stochastic systems as being those systems for which
the CMC holds, and derives the definition of Sec. II D as an abstract model that explains this behaviour. In the
first approach, the causal structure is implicitly assumed to be a given feature of the world, and the consequences
for experiments are obtained from it through a process of deduction. In the second approach, it is the experimental
results that form the starting point, and the causal structure is obtained from them through a process of abstraction.
The first route is more natural to the causal realist, for whom a classical stochastic system describes something that
exists in the world independently of observation. The second route is more natural to the causal relativist, for whom
a classical stochastic system actually describes the features that are consistent across a set of experiments. We will
therefore adopt this second route.
From this point of view, the CMC describes a set of conditions that have been found to hold empirically for a
wide range of macroscopic systems, and which is then used to characterize them. In this section we will see how it
can be broken down into three special cases, which we deal with in turn. The first one is already familiar; we repeat
it here for convenience:
FCC. Factorization on common causes:
Suppose neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and C is the complete set of their shared ancestors, i.e. C contains
all ‘common causes’ (see Fig. 2(a)); then P (X1X2|C) = P (X1|C)P (X2|C) [22].
Taken as a postulate, the principle FCC was historically conceived as just one part of a more general postulate pro-
posed by Hans Reichenbach [23], often called ‘Reichenbach’s Principle’. The FCC is sometimes called the quantitative
part of Reichenbach’s Principle to distinguish it from the qualitative component [24]. Since there is no consensus in
the literature as to the proper usage of the label ‘Reichenbach’s Principle’, we will use the term exclusively to refer
to the latter ‘qualitative’ component:
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RP. Reichenbach’s Principle:
If neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, then they are statistically indepen-
dent: P (X1X2) = P (X1)P (X2). (Note: Following Ref. [18] we have presented it in the contrapositive of its more
common form: ‘if two variables are correlated, one must cause the other or they must have a common cause, or both’).
Since RP can be obtained from FCC by setting C = ∅, it is a strictly weaker principle. RP captures the intuitive
fact that two systems with independent causal histories should be initially uncorrelated. (The requirement that the
probabilities should also factorize conditional on their common causes as in FCC is more controversial, particularly
for quantum systems, as we will discuss in Sec. IV A 3). The second fundamental component of the CMC is:
SSO. Sequential screening-off:
Suppose X1 causes X2 and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose every path connecting X1 to X2 is inter-
cepted by a variable in D, i.e. contains a chain X1 → D → X2 (see Fig. 2(b)); then P (X1X2|D) = P (X1|D)P (X2|D) .
The principle SSO expresses the idea (in probabilistic language) that all of the information relevant to a system’s
future behaviour is encoded in its present state. This intuitive property is a feature of all known physical theories at
the fundamental level of description, including quantum mechanics. Put another way, SSO says that conditioning
on D ‘screens off’ the future measurement X2 from the past, because knowing D makes X1 redundant. The third
component of the CMC is:
BK. Berkson’s rule:
Suppose neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose B is a common
descendant of X1, X2 (see Fig. 2(c)); then one generally expects X1, X2 to be correlated conditional on B, i.e.
P (X1X2|B) 6= P (X1|B)P (X2|B).
The principle BK derives from a well-known result in statistics called ‘Berkson’s Paradox’, after the medical
statistician Joseph Berkson [25]. Despite not really being a paradox, newcomers to statistics often find it counter-
intuitive. Note that whereas FCC and SSO give conditions under which statistical independence is mandatory, the
principle BK gives conditions under which correlations are expected. Just like NFT, it depends on a ‘typicality’
argument: in nearly all of the systems considered, it is found to be true.
FIG. 2. Three special cases in which the Causal Markov Condition reduces to simpler principles: (a) variables X1, X2 only
connected through common causes, where CMC reduces to FCC; (b) X1, X2 only connected through intermediate causes,
where CMC reduces to SSO; (c) X1, X2 connected only through common effects, where CMC reduces to BK.
We mention for completeness a fourth principle that is commonly mixed up with the others, although it is quite
separate from them:
PI. The Principle of Independence:
If neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have shared ancestors, then one generally expects them to be
correlated: P (X1X2) 6= P (X1)P (X2).
PI affirms the complement of RP, namely, it asserts that (in nearly all cases) systems with a shared history are
correlated. Some light can be shed on this principle by noting that, if it is assumed to hold alongside RP, then it
introduces a fundamental asymmetry into the system, because it implies that the ‘causal inverse’ of RP (obtained by
replacing ‘ancestors’ with ‘descendants’ in its definition) is false. Empirically, macroscopic classical systems appear to
obey PI, and so it is often included among the set of physical Markov conditions for classical systems. As a physical
Markov condition its status is similar to that of NFT and BK, in that it only needs hold for ‘nearly all’ systems
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within the class, but can fail for special sub-classes. Price [19] has argued that the justification for PI essentially
rests on arguments that do not apply to microscopic (specifically quantum) systems. In agreement with Price, the
quantum causal model we present later on will explicitly reject PI.
Strictly speaking, the conditions FCC, SSO and BK can only be applied to causal graphs having the form of
one of the three special cases displayed in Fig. 2. Ideally, we would like to have an empirical postulate that could
apply to a system with arbitrary causal structure. One way to achieve this is to convert the postulates FCC, SSO
and BK into corresponding graphical rules that allow their consequences to be deduced by direct inspection of the
causal structure. The graphical rules can then be jointly applied to any causal structure. The result is the following
alternative graphical formulation of the CMC [1, 2]:
CMC3. Causal Markov Condition (graphical version):
Let U,V and W be disjoint sets of nodes in a DAG G(X). A path from X1 to X2 in G(X) is said to be blocked by
W iff at least one of the following graphical conditions holds:
g-RP1. There is a fork X1 ← C → X2 on the path where C is in W;
g-SSO. There is a chain X1 → C → X2 on the path where C is in W;
g-BK. There is a collider X1 → C ← X2 on the path where C is not in W and has no descendants in W.
If all paths between U,V are blocked by W, then the d-separation theorem [1] states that U and V are inde-
pendent conditional on W in any distribution P (X) that satisfies the factorization condition CMC for the DAG G(X).
Thus by interpreting the three conditions FCC,SSO, BK as graphical criteria, namely as g-RP1, g-SSO, g-
BK described above, one can derive any and all constraints implied by the CMC. In this way, although the three
conditions FCC,SSO, BK individually apply to only limited classes of causal structures, they can be combined via
the graphical representation to obtain a condition that applies to arbitrary causal structures, and this condition is
the CMC.
This approach emphasizes the fact that the CMC is ultimately an extrapolation from a set of simpler empirical laws
that were found to hold in a large but limited set of actual experiments on macroscopic systems. Our interpretation
of the CMC as a contingent property of a class of physical systems, rather than a necessary property of all systems,
is compatible with the approach taken in Woodward [3], and in Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines [2], who also regard the
CMC as being justified on purely empirical grounds. It stands in contrast to the treatment of Pearl, who derives it
as a theorem based on the metaphysical assumption of determinism in the underlying laws of physics [1]. (For readers
more inclined to this latter view, we note that an approach to quantum causality along these lines can be pursued by
replacing classical determinism with the alternative metaphysical assumption of unitary evolution, as was shown in
the work of Allen. et. al. [18]).
B. Passive and active measurements in classical causal models
Our restriction to the class of classical stochastic systems allows us to further refine the measurements involved in
the reference experiment. For causal modeling, we need consider only two kinds of ideal measurements: non-disturbing
measurements and interventions.
A non-disturbing measurement represents an ideal limit of a passive observation: it is a measurement that can be
performed without disturbing the system in any way. To formalize this idea, we need to clarify what is meant by a
‘disturbance of the system’. For a causal relativist, a disturbance does not refer to a change in any ontological state, or
a disruption of any ontological process, as the realist might interpret it. Rather, it refers to whether the observer can
infer the presence or absence of the measurement from changes in the behaviour of the other experimentally observed
quantities.
More precisely, let us partition the measurements on a system in the reference experiment into two sets X ∪ Z,
and write the system’s behaviour as P (X,Z|Z+) where the conditional Z+ is to remind us that ‘the measurements
Z are actually performed in this experiment’. Conversely, let P (X|Z−) indicate the behaviour of the system in a
counterfactual experiment in which the measurements Z are not performed (signified by Z−). Then we define:
ND. Non-disturbing measurements:
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The set of measurements Z is called non-disturbing relative to the set of variables S ⊆ X iff:
P (S|Z−) = P (S|Z+)
=
∑
z
P (S, z|Z+) . (10)
In the special case that Z is non-disturbing relative to all other variables in the system, i.e. S = X, we will simply
call Z non-disturbing.
We can summarize equation (10) as saying that Z are non-disturbing iff performing them and ignoring their outcomes
is equivalent to not performing them at all. Notice that this equation enables us to calculate the behaviour of the
system in a counterfactual scenario P (S|Z−) using the data from the reference experiment – it therefore constitutes
an example of what we have called counterfactual inference. Nevertheless, in this instance, the relevant inference rule
(10) is only a marginalization of the probabilities in the reference experiment, and this requires no knowledge of the
causal structure or any other properties of the system.
An intervention, by contrast, is a type of active manipulation that disturbs the system in a precise and highly
localized manner. An intervention can usefully be thought of as equivalent to introducing a randomized control
into an experiment. Physically, it means forcing a target variable W to take a particular value in a manner that is
independent of its causes pa(W ) within the system. One example is actively controlling the temperature of a system
instead of passively measuring its temperature under ambient conditions. Another is assigning patients in a drug
trial randomly to the treatment or control groups, instead of allowing them to choose whether to take the treatment
themselves.
An intervention on W ∈ X introduces a control variable CW that controls the value of W . It is convenient to
define the domain of the control variable as being equal to the domain of W , plus a special value ‘’ corresponding
to the ‘idle’ state, with dom(CW ) := {dom(W ),}. When CW = , no intervention is performed and one recovers
the original probability distribution:
P (X|CW = ) := P (X) . (11)
Conversely, we will often want to refer to the situation in which the intervention is not idle, but without specifying
its value. For this purpose, we will use CW+:
P (X|CW+) := P (X|CW 6= ) . (12)
It is important to emphasize that P (X|CW+), P (X|CW , CW+), P (X|CW ) are all non-equivalent. In particular,
P (X|CW , CW+) conditions on the specific value of CW = c given that CW 6= , while P (X|CW ) conditions on the
specific value of CW , including when CW = .
For interventions, we assume that the non-idle values of CW completely determine the values of W , i.e. W = c for
c 6= . This results in a new set of probabilities, P (X|CW , CW+), which describes the behavior of the system in the
counterfactual experiment in which the variable W is intervened upon and its value set to c (Note: in the literature
this distribution is typically expressed as a ‘do-conditional’, P (X|do(W = c)) [1, 2]). Like all active manipulations,
interventions satisfy externality and counterfactual no-signalling (recall Sec. II E).
The first inference rule for interventions describes how they affect the causal structure. Let us use G(X, CW ) to
denote the causal structure of the system resulting from the intervention. Clearly, G(X, CW ) must incorporate CW as
an additional node. By definition, CW is localized to W , meaning that it is a direct cause of W and only W . By exter-
nality, CW itself has no causes within the system, hence is exogenous in G(X, CW ). Furthermore, since the value of W
is determined by the value of CW 6= , it will be statistically independent of those variables that were previously the
parents of W prior to the intervention. Since causation implies correlation (a corollary of NFT), it must be the case
that these variables are no longer parents of W in G(X, CW ). Thus we arrive at the first inference rule of interventions:
IR1. The causal structure after the intervention, G(X, CW ), should be obtained from G(X) by deleting all incom-
ing arrows to W and then introducing CW as the sole parent of W (see Fig. 3).
To derive the second inference rule, we will further assume that interventions do not allow any ‘placebo effect’,
that is, we assume that the control variable can only affect the other variables through its influence on W :
NPE. No placebo effect:
The act of intervening on W cannot affect the causal descendants of W , except through the value of W itself. Formally,
let D be the descendants of W . Then:
P (D|W = c, CW ) = P (D|W = c) . (13)
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FIG. 3. A causal graph before and after an intervention CW on W .
Note that NPE applies to all values of CW including its ‘idle’ value. This means we can also define it as the
requirement that CW must be non-disturbing relative to the descendants of W , by identifying CW =  with the
statement that ‘CW is not performed’ in the definition ND.
The name of NPE refers to the well-known placebo effect in medical science, in which the patient’s mere knowledge
that they are in the treatment group is sufficient to improve their condition, regardless of the actual efficacy of the
treatment. The standard way to eliminate the effect is to ensure that the patient does not know whether they are in
the treatment or the control group, so that any improvement in their condition can only be attributed to the amount
of treatment (i.e. the value of W ) and not to the mere knowledge of being treated (i.e. knowledge of the value of
CW ).
To derive the second inference rule we posit that the post-intervention probabilities P (X|CW , CW+) should satisfy
the CMC relative to the new DAG G(X, CW ). This is a useful requirement, because it means that the post-
intervention pair {P (X|CW , CW+), G(X, CW )} is again a valid causal model and can therefore be used as the starting
point for further counterfactual inferences, such as additional interventions. Given the structure of G(X, CW ) as
defined by IR1, the CMC implies that P (X|CW , CW+) factorizes into a product of the general form:
P (X|CW , CW+) = P (W |pa(W ), CW , CW+)
∏
i
P (Xi|pa(Xi), CW+) . (14)
(We always use pa(W ) to refer to the parents of W excluding CW ). Since W is equal to the value of CW after the
intervention, we replace P (W |pa(W ), CW , CW+) with a Kronecker delta δ(W,CW ), i.e. the discrete distribution that
satisfies δ(W = w,CW = c) = 1 iff w = c and is zero otherwise. As for the remaining terms P (Xi|pa(Xi), CW+),
they must be treated differently depending on whether Xi is a descendant of W or not. In either case, we obtain the
same rule:
P (Xi|pa(Xi), CW+) = P (Xi|pa(Xi)) , (15)
but the justification differs. For the non-descendants of W , (15) follows from counterfactual no-signalling and the
consistency rule (11), whereas for the descendants of W , it follows from no placebo effect (13). Putting these together
in (14), we obtain the second inference rule for interventions:
IR2. An observer’s probability assignments for a counterfactual experiment where an intervention CW is performed
on W are given by:
P (X|CW , CW+) = δ(W,CW )
∏
i
P (Xi|pa(Xi)) . (16)
This rule is usually postulated upfront as an axiom, not derived from general principles as we have done here. To infer
the result of interventions on multiple variables W ⊆ X, the procedure for intervening on one variable can simply
be iterated (It can easily be proven that the order of interventions does not affect the final result, i.e. sequential
interventions on different variables commute).
1. A side-note on exogenous variables
In a causal model, variables without parents in the system (exogenous variables) play a special role: they represent
certain background conditions that exist prior to the experiment and that partly serve to define the experiment.
They include, for instance, the initial state of all the systems of interest, as well as the initial state of any relevant
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environmental factors such as the temperature or noise-level in the laboratory. Clearly some of these background
variables might be set by the environment and thus could be passively observed, while others might be controlled by
the experimenters through active manipulation. In either case, it must be emphasized that the choice of exogenous
variables is inextricably tied to the very definition of the system. As such, it would not make sense to ask what
would happen if an exogenous measurement were not performed, since the performance of the measurement is a
necessary condition for the system to be well-defined. We cannot speak of the properties of an ideal gas on the
assumption that no attempt was made to isolate a gas and confine it to a chamber, any more than we could talk
about the taste or temperature of a cake on the assumption that it was never baked. This creates a certain paradox
regarding so-called ‘natural experiments’. The exogenous variables in such cases are considered to be set by ambient
environmental conditions, and so we would like on the one hand to describabe them as ‘non-disturbing’. However,
being exogenous, definition ND may not apply to them, i.e. because the system is not well-defined in absence of
them. To resolve this, it is enough to note that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘not performing’ an exogenous
measurement. In the case of the cake, an ‘unobserved cake’ may refer to a cake that was not baked at all, or one that
was baked without being observed (perhaps automatically by a machine). When contemplating either case, there
are no measured properties of the cake to which the observer can meaningfully refer. However, if he has reason to
believe that the cake would exist and possess its exogenous properties with the same likelihood even when they are
not measured, then he may reasonably say that the measurements of these properties (eg. T := ‘temperature of cake
when observed leaving the oven’) are non-disturbing. By contrast, if the observer happens to be Superman using
his heat-vision to observe the cake, it would be more appropriate to say that the exogenous variable T is an active
manipulation, since if Superman had not been looking, the cake might not have been baked, and so would not possess
the property T . Ultimately, the judgement as to whether exogenous variables are ‘non-disturbing’ or not can only be
decided by considerations that are beyond the scope of the given causal model. (They could perhaps be dealt with
by embedding the causal model into a larger system that posits causes for the exogenous variables, but we will not
pursue that possibility here).
C. Classical Observational and Interventionist schemes
Counterfactual inference is, in general, a one-way operation. An intervention gives a concrete example of the one-way
nature of inference: although it is possible to deduce the system’s behaviour and causal structure under intervention
{P (X|CW , CW+), G(X, CW )} from the behaviour and causal structure of a reference experiment {P (X), G(X)} via
the inference rules discussed in the previous section, the converse is not true. This is because the act of intervention
involves the deletion of causal influences that were previously active, and there is no unique way to restore these
arrows just from the post-intervention information. This induces a natural (possibly partial) ordering on the set of
counterfactual experiments, such that the higher ranking members in the order have the power to make counterfactual
inferences about the lower-ranking members, but not vice-versa. It is therefore most natural to take as the reference
experiment one of the experiments that ranks at the top of this natural ordering, because this guarantees that it can
be used to make inferences about the largest possible set of counterfactual experiments.
In the special case of classical causal models, we are restricted to counterfactual experiments in which all variables
are either the result of non-disturbing measurements or interventions. It is easy to show that in this case an experiment
will be at the top of the ordering if and only if all of its non-exogenous variables are non-disturbing measurements (the
exogenous ones can be of either type). An experiment in which all the non-exogenous variables are non-disturbing
is traditionally called an observational scheme, because it represents an ideal of ‘pure observation’. Similarly, any
experiment involving one or more interventions on the non-exogenous nodes is called an interventionist scheme. Thus
we have the result that in classical causal models, the reference experiment is typically an observational scheme, and
the counterfactual experiments correspond to different interventionist schemes. It is important to remember, however,
that the coincidence of these concepts is not logically necessary, but rather is a contingent feature of our restriction to
classical causal models. In general scenarios, the reference experiment need not be an observational scheme. Indeed,
in the following sections, we will propose a quantum causal model in which these definitions do not coincide.
IV. A RELATIVIST APPROACH TO CAUSALITY VIA QBISM
A. Problems with defining quantum causal models
Following the general pattern that was established in the classical case, there are three main questions that need to be
answered when attempting to define a quantum causal model. First, what should be used as the reference experiment,
and what is the nature of the ideal measurements used in it, i.e. are they the results of passive observations or active
20
manipulations? Second, what are the relevant physical Markov conditions for the class of quantum systems, and in
what ways do these deviate from the CMC? Third, what are the inference rules that tell us how to compute the
behaviour in an arbitrary counterfactual experiment, using only the probabilities P (X) from the reference experiment
plus the causal structure G(X)?
The first obstacle in our path is how to define an experiment on a quantum system in keeping with the ‘quality
standards’ of ideal experiments outlined in Sec. II C. As we will see in the next section, the ideal measurements
on quantum systems are typically disturbing measurements in the sense of definition ND. This means we can no
longer maintain the classical conception of the reference experiment as being an observational scheme in which all
non-exogenous measurements are non-disturbing. The implications of this need to be understood.
Secondly, given that the ideal measurements are disturbing, the classical recipe for calculating counterfactuals in
which certain measurements were not performed (recall Eq. (10)) no longer applies. This poses the problem of
deriving a new inference rule to replace Eq. (10). Finally, it is already well documented in the literature that the
factorization on common causes FCC does not seem to hold for quantum systems, as we will discuss shortly in Sec.
IV A 3. Must we then try to salvage FCC by weakening it or re-interpreting it, as some authors have done, or should
it be given up entirely, as others have advocated? And if it is given up, then what remains of the CMC?
1. Screening-off and measurement disturbance
One of the defining features of classical causal models is that, apart from the exogenous variables, all measurements
in the reference experiment are non-disturbing, which justifies labeling it an observational scheme. Furthermore, the
model satisfies the CMC and in particular the sequential screening-off condition SSO described in Sec. III A. It
will now be shown that measurements on quantum systems cannot simultaneously satisfy these conditions, i.e. they
cannot both be ideal non-disturbing measurements and satisfy SSO.
Consider the following case: let A be an exogenous variable representing the choice of preparation of a system,
and let B,C be subsequent measurements made on the system in that order. Evidently, manipulations of A can
affect B and manipulations of B can affect C in the sense of counterfactual causation, and so the causal graph is
A→ B → C. The SSO, if it applies to quantum systems, would therefore require P (A,B,C) = P (C|B)P (B|A)P (A),
or equivalently, P (A,C|B) = P (A|B)P (C|B).
For quantum systems, this conditional independence implies that the post-measurement state conditioned on B
is independent of the variable A. Furthermore, to fulfill property (iii) of an ideal experiment (recall Sec. II C), the
post-measurement state Πb conditioned on the outcome ‘B = b’ should be a pure state for each value b (see Appendix
A for details). However, if the post-measurement state conditioned on B = b is pure, then it necessarily represents a
disturbance. That is, one can find measurements A,C for which P (A,C|B−) 6=
∑
b
P (A,C|b, B+) in violation of the
definition of non-disturbance ND (Sec. III B).
For example, let A,B,C be measurements on a spin one-half particle. Let the first and last measurements A,C
be projective measurements in the Pauli σZ basis, and let B be a measurement in the diagonal basis
1√
2
(σX + σZ).
Then P (A,C|B−) exhibits perfect correlation between A,C (since A determines C) but P (A,C|B+) exhibits only
weak correlations, since the intermediate measurement B results in a state that is superposed along the σZ-axis,
adding noise to the final σZ measurement. In conclusion, one cannot maintain both the SSO for sequential ideal
measurements and the assumption that these measurements are non-disturbing.
2. Quantum measurements and ‘passive’ observation
In response to the problem just mentioned, some authors have proposed that the SSO should be relaxed, either
by introducing ‘quantum variables’ that cannot be conditioned upon as in Ref. [26], or by dropping the requirement
altogether, as in Refs. [27, 28]. In the present work, we take a different perspective. First, it must be noted that even
if we drop SSO, we cannot find any non-trivial measurements that are not disturbing in the sense of violating ND;
this is a simple corollary of the principle of ‘no information without disturbance’ [29]. Nor do we lose any generality by
choosing to retain SSO, since any quantum measurement can be made to conform to it by modeling it as a projective
measurement on a larger Hilbert space (Stinespring’s dilation theorem). It was pointed out in Sec. II D that physical
Markov conditions like SSO play a central role in causal inference, and so we should be reluctant to give them up
without compelling reasons. Since it appears we have much to lose and little to gain in dropping SSO, we elect to
retain it as a physical Markov condition applicable to quantum systems.
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We are left with the problem that the reference experiment is now composed of disturbing measurements, and so
does not fit the classical definition of an observational scheme, i.e. one in which all non-exogenous measurements are
non-disturbing. It must be added that quantum measurements cannot simply be interpreted as interventions either.
Recalling the example of measurements on a spin one-half particle, the intervening measurement B in the diagonal
basis disturbs the system but does not altogether break the causal influence of A on C, as an intervention would: it is
still possible to detect manipulations of A by inspecting the statistics at C. Quantum measurements therefore seem
to fit neither in the category of ideal non-disturbing measurements, nor in the category of ideal interventions.
A prominent strategy in the literature is to treat quantum measurements as a generalization of interventions to
encompass ‘non-ideal’ interventions. To do this for quantum systems, one typically replaces ‘intervention’ with the
mathematical notion of a ‘quantum instrument’, and this can encompass both ‘hard’ interventions and ‘soft’ quantum
measurements [13, 18]. This approach is best suited to the causal realist, who is willing to regard causal structure
as a kind of abstract machine (presumably describing something that exists ontologically) that takes interventions
as inputs and produces probabilities as outputs. As such, there is no need to introduce the concept of a ‘reference
experiment’ and thus no need to consider any other class of measurements besides interventions (suitably generalized).
For the causal relativist, however, causal structure represents a relation between a counterfactual experiment and
the reference experiment, and the latter necessarily involves measurements that do not break the causal connections,
i.e. measurements that play a special role in causal inference distinct from interventions. We therefore follow the
alternative route of Refs. [16, 30, 31] in which it is proposed that, for the purposes of causal modeling, ‘quantum mea-
surements’ should refer to a new class of measurements that are intermediate between non-disturbing measurements
and interventions. They are able to reveal information about the quantum state, thereby introducing a disturbance,
but it is a special kind of disturbance that does not break the chain of causal influence.
Having adopted this view, we are still faced with the question as to whether such measurements should be classified
as passive observations or active manipulations. Our definition of the reference experiment is sufficiently general
to allow either classification (recall Sec. II C). It must be stressed that the fact that quantum measurements are
disturbing need not exclude them from being categorized as ‘passive observations’ under an appropriately refined
definition of that term. However, the complications involved in proposing such a refinement make this option much
more challenging. We will revisit this possibility in Sec. V C. For the present work, however, we will take the easier
route of classifying quantum measurements as a type of active manipulation. To do this, it is necessary to associate a
‘control variable’ to these measurements, having at least two values. This can be done in a natural way by letting the
control value determine whether or not the measurement is performed. We will formalize this shortly in Sec. IV B,
by introducing the notion of an un-measurement.
3. Common causes and entanglement
In the previous sections, we explained how SSO could be maintained for quantum systems, at the cost of introducing
active manipulations into the reference experiment. In this section we turn to another of the classical Markov
conditions, FCC, and review how it fails for quantum systems. Consider three measurements A,B,C on a quantum
system, such that the space-time regions B,C are in the future light-cone of A, and may be space-like separated from
each other (but they don’t have to be). Suppose it is found that manipulations of A can affect the probabilities of both
B and C, but manipulations of B do not affect C (and vice-versa). Then this scenario is represented by the causal graph
B ← A→ C, i.e. A is the common cause of B,C. In this case the FCC implies P (A,B,C) = P (B|A)P (C|A)P (A).
To see how this condition can fail, consider a particular implementation of this experiment in which A measures
a system with Hilbert space HA := HB ⊗ HC , and B,C are subsequently performed on the parts of the system
that are represented by the respective sub-spaces HB and HC . In this implementation, if the state produced by the
measurement A (conditional on the outcome A = a) is entangled between the partitions corresponding to B,C, then
it is possible to violate the factorization condition FCC, even under ideal experimental conditions. When dealing
with classical systems, the usual response to this situation would be to infer that there must be additional latent
variables L serving as additional common causes of B,C, such that conditioning on the values of both A and L would
eliminate the correlations (thus satisfying the extended principle CMC2).
There are two strong reasons why this explanation does not work in the quantum implementation just described.
First, as established in the preceding Sec. IV A 1, the state prepared by the measurement A must be pure conditional
on A = a. Hence the postulation of additional variables L is tantamount to admitting that a pure quantum state
is only an incomplete description of the variables relevant to the system: for the latent variables L are not part of
quantum theory, but are supplements that must be added in order to rescue CMC2. It must be stressed that despite
great efforts, no such variables have every been directly measured, which already casts doubt on their existence.
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the existence of the hypothesized latent variables is Bell’s theorem
[32]. It requires that we extend the experiment to allow a variation in the choice of the measurements B,C. To
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accommodate this in the causal model, we introduce new variables SB , SC corresponding to the respective measure-
ment settings, and treated as exogenous variables under experimental control (It would not do to treat them as the
control variables of interventions on B,C, because they do not determine their values, as our version of the classical
definition would require. This is of no special importance – we could have defined interventions more generally so as
to include them). In this ‘Bell-type’ experiment, the corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. 4 and the CMC2
(allowing latent variables) implies the constraint:
P (A,B,C, SB , SC) =
∑
l
P (B|SB , A, l)P (C|SC , A, l)P (SB)P (SC)P (A, l) . (17)
This constraint can be proven to imply Bell inequalities on the marginal distribution P (A,B,C, SB , SC). These
inequalities have been found to be violated in experiments by certain strongly entangled states, in accordance with
quantum theory, apparently ruling out any explanation in terms of latent common causes as represented in Fig. 4.
FIG. 4. The Bell scenario, aka the common-cause scenario with variable measurement settings. Assuming no fine-tuning, this
causal hypothesis is ruled out as an explanation for quantum systems whose statistics violate Bell inequalities.
Subsequent developments have only strengthened this conclusion. It has been pointed out that if we uphold the
condition of no fine-tuning, then the statistics observed in such experiments cannot be made to fit the CMC2 for
any causal structure [33]. This includes even those hypotheses that grant the latent variables absurd powers, such as
faster-than-light speed.
Within the framework of causal modelling, it must be pointed out that all of the difficulties depend on there being
some kind of deep metaphysical reason to adhere to the condition FCC as being universally applicable. This would
be the case if, for instance, one were convinced that the universe should admit of a description by deterministic
mechanisms, or classical stochastic mechanisms. Setting aside such metaphysical prejudices, we can instead choose to
regard quantum systems as a new class of physical matter in its own right that is characterized by a different set of
physical Markov conditions than are the classical stochastic systems, and in particular is not subject to FCC. This
side-steps (for the time being) the metaphysical problems and turns our attention to the purely empirical problem of
elucidating the connection between probabilities and causality for this new class of systems. That is the task we take
up next.
B. Ideal quantum measurements and counterfactual inference
In Sec. IV A 2 it was determined that a quantum causal model introduces a fundamentally new class of mea-
surements, that we will call ideal quantum measurements, as distinct from either non-disturbing measurements or
interventions. These measurements are the ones that are used to obtain information about the system in the reference
experiment. In this section, we will ask: what are the precise properties of these ideal quantum measurements?
For simplicity, let us take as our reference experiment the familiar example of the ‘causal chain’, in which three
measurements X,Y, Z are performed in succession (that is, in time-like separated space-time regions) and whose causal
relations are represented by the causal graph X → Y → Z. Here, Y is the quantum measurement whose properties
will be investigated. Now suppose that the detector or measuring apparatus that is responsible for measuring Y in
its designated space-time region is to be removed from the experiment, or disabled. We will call such an operaton an
un-measurement of Y , and we will model it just like any active manipulation:
Un-measurements: Let P (X, Z) represent the behaviour of a system in the reference experiment. To model an un-
measurement of Z, we introduce a control variable CZ , with values c ∈ {+,−}, corresponding to ‘measure Z’ and ‘don’t
measure Z’ respectively. When Z is measured, we recover the reference experiment: P (X, Z|CZ = +) := P (X, Z).
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When Z is not measured, the behaviour changes to P (X, Z|CZ = −), which must be specified by an appropriate
inference rule.
For convenience we will often use the shorthand Z± in place of CZ = ±, except where this might cause confusion.
Note that in the special case where Z is non-disturbing relative to X, the appropriate inference rule is simply given
by Eq. (10) in ND.
Returning to our example of the causal chain, we wish to know what is the inference rule to obtain P (X,Z|Y −).
Fortunately, the answer to this has already been worked out, though in the quite different context of the “QBist”
approach to quantum mechanics [34, 35]. Before discussing how it arose there, we review how the rule is derived.
First, note that if we could reconstruct the state ρ(x) (for each outcome x ∈ domX) just before the measurement
Y using only the probabilities P (Y |X), and if we could also reconstruct the POVM elements {Ez : z ∈ domZ} from
the probabilities P (Z|Y ), then we could simply obtain the probabilities P (X,Z|Y −) using the Born rule:
P (X,Z|Y −) = Tr [ρ(X)EZ ] . (18)
Assuming we make no special assumptions about the allowed states ρ(X), then state reconstruction from the prob-
abilities P (Y |X) is possible if and only if Y is an informationally complete (IC) measurement. For the purposes of
obtaining a simple and elegant expression, we choose Y to be a symmetric informationally complete measurement (or
SIC-measurement). Let d be the dimension of the subsystem measured at Y . Then a SIC -measurement is defined by
a set of d2 projectors {Πy : y ∈ domY } on this Hilbert space, having the special property:
Tr [ΠyΠy′ ] =
d δ(y, y′) + 1
d + 1
, ∀ y, y′ ∈ domY . (19)
The measurement itself is then described by the SIC-POVM
1
d
ΠY := {1
d
Πy : y ∈ domY } , (20)
and the post-measurement state corresponding to the outcome Y = y is defined to be Πy (the Lu¨ders rule). The
elements of any IC-POVM define a basis for the space of linear operators on the associated Hilbert space. In particular,
for a SIC-POVM 1dΠY , we can expand ρ(X) and the POVM EZ as:
ρ(X) =
∑
y
αy(X)
1
d
Πy
EZ =
∑
y
βy(Z)
1
d
Πy . (21)
The coefficients αY (X), βY (Z) are related to the measurement probabilities according to [34]:
αY (X) = d(d + 1)P (Y |X)− 1
βY (Z) = (d + 1)P (Z|Y )− 1
d
∑
y
P (Z|y) . (22)
By substituting (21),(22) into the right hand side of the Born Rule (18), one can then establish the important equation,
called the Urgleichung [34]:
P (Z|X,Y −) =
∑
y
P (Z|y)
[
(1 + d)P (y|X)− 1
d
]
. (23)
The Urgleichung only gives us P (Z|X,Y −), but we require the full distribution P (X,Z|Y −). Using elementary
probability theory, we can decompose this as:
P (X,Z|Y −) = P (Z|X,Y −)P (X|Y −) . (24)
To proceed, we can make use of the fact that un-measurements, by virtue of being a type of active manipulation,
must satisfy counterfactual no-signalling CNS. Hence the value of CY (whether or not Y is measured) should not
affect the variable X, because it is an ancestor of Y , i.e.
P (X|Y −) = P (X|Y +) . (25)
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Substituting (25) and the Urgleichung (23) into (24) we finally obtain the sought-after inference rule for this example:
P (X,Z|Y −) = P (Z|X,Y −)P (X)
=
∑
y
P (Z|y)
[
(1 + d)P (y|X)− 1
d
]
P (X) . (26)
Therefore, in the context of causal modeling, the Urgleichung gives us the foundation for an inference rule for un-
measurements. One of the interesting features of this inference rule is that it depends on the causal structure. To
see this explicitly, consider what would happen if the accompanying causal structure had instead been G(X,Y, Z) :=
X ← Y ← Z. In that case the condition (25) would not follow from CNS, since X is now in the causal future of Y .
Instead, CNS implies P (Z|Y −) = P (Z|Y +), and we obtain a different form of the rule:
P (X,Z|Y −) = P (X|Z, Y −)P (Z|Y −)
= P (X|Z, Y −)P (Z)
=
∑
y
P (X|y)
[
(1 + d)P (y|Z)− 1
d
]
P (Z) , (27)
which in general is not equivalent to the constraint (26) (more precisely, neither of (26),(27) implies the other, but nor
do they exclude each other, i.e. both can be satisfied simultaneously). What is important is that the causal structure
is sufficient to determine the form of the inference rule. Thus, at least for this simple scenario, the postulate of causal
sufficiency CS is maintained (Sec. II C). In other words, for quantum systems, we can continue to define causal
structure as the information that is sufficient to make deductions about the results of active manipulations, which
now necessarily includes un-measurements. Of course, the inference rule still needs to be generalized to arbitrary
causal structures; this will be done in Sec. IV F.
It is curious that the QBists derived the Urgleichung for quite different purposes: they used it as a means of
expressing the Born rule purely in terms of probability distributions, in order to re-formulate quantum theory entirely
as a theory of the subjective beliefs of rational agents. Here we have seen that, seemingly by accident, the Urgleichung
plays a role in causal inference, at least when the problem of causal inference is framed as we have done it in this
paper. Recalling that the present approach was motivated by the appeal to a relativist account of causality, this points
to a possible connection between the QBist approach to quantum mechanics and the relativist view of causality. It
would be interesting to explore this connection in future work.
C. Quantum reference experiments
From the analysis of the preceding section, we saw that it is necessary to include un-measurements as a new type of
idealized active manipulation for which causal structure is needed to perform counterfactual inference. For counter-
factual inference about un-measurements to be possible, we saw that the measurements in the reference experiment
should be informationally complete. Thus, in addition to the properties (i)-(iv) of ideal experiments in Sec. II C, we
may add the following:
(v) All measurements in an ideal experiment are IC-measurements.
We are now in a position to define a quantum reference experiment, based on the convention of taking the relevant
IC-measurements to be SIC-measurements:
QRE. Quantum reference experiment
A reference experiment on a quantum system is an ideal experiment (as per Sec. II C) in which the non-exogenous
variables represent SIC-measurements.
This move might seem risky, because it is not known whether SIC-POVMs actually exist in all Hilbert space
dimensions. However, that is only a problem if we give a special preference to the Hilbert space formulation of
quantum mechanics versus the probabilistic formulation given by the QBists. If it should happen that the two do not
coincide, i.e. that there exists a Hilbert space dimension in which SICs do not exist, then experiments on a system
of this dimension would presumably serve to differentiate the QBist model of quantum mechanics from standard
quantum mechanics. While an enticing possibility, this is pure speculation, for no contra-indications to the existence
of SICs in all dimensions have yet been found.
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We must also keep in mind that the SIC-measurements are not meant to be realistic, but are conceptual ideal-
izations, just as non-disturbing measurements and interventions are idealizations, which might not even be perfectly
implementable in principle [36]; such idealizations serve to signpost the conceptual boundaries of the spaces in which
reality plays. The benefit of assuming that SIC-measurements are always available for systems of any dimension is
that the rule of counterfactual inference for un-measurements acquires a simple and elegant form as we will see in
Sec. IV F 1.
D. Quantum Markov Conditions
Now that the essential details of a quantum reference experiment have been identified, we turn to the problem of
finding a set of physical Markov conditions for quantum systems. Let us consider the general properties of quantum
systems for the three special cases considered in Sec. III A: common causes, the causal chain, and common effects.
From these three cases, we will then extrapolate a general rule that we expect to hold for all causal structures.
To begin with, we remark that the physical Markov conditions SSO, RP and BK all continue to be valid for
quantum systems in ideal experiments. The arguments for retaining SSO have already been given in Sec. IV A 1. For
RP and BK, we repeat them here for ease of reference, and briefly explain the justification for carrying them over to
the quantum regime. Note that since we are motivated to retain as many physical Markov conditions as possible (for
the purposes of enabling causal inference), a justifiation only needs to show that the given condition is not rejected
outright by quantum theory.
RP. Reichenbach’s Principle:
If neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, then they are statistically independent:
P (X1X2) = P (X1)P (X2).
The claim that measurements on parts of a system that have no causal ancestry should produce uncorrelated out-
comes seems almost self-evident. Nevertheless, we will justify it for quantum systems in a little more detail. Let E1 be
the set of ancestors of X1 that are exogenous, and similarly let E2 be the exogenous ancestors of X2. By assumption,
E1,E2 have no members in common. Moreover, in an ideal experiment, we must have P (E1,E2) = P (E1)P (E2)
(condition (v), Sec. II C). These measurements can be regarded as preparing a quantum state with the form ρE1⊗ρE2
on a Hilbert space HE1 ⊗ HE2 . Moreover, the causal structure implies that manipulations of ρE1 can signal to X1
but not to X2, and similarly that manipulations of ρE2 can signal to X2 but not to X1. This can be represented
by a quantum channel T1 ⊗ T2 which is the tensor product of the independent channels T1 : HE1 7→ HX1 and
T2 : HE2 7→ HX2 . Evidently, such a channel can only map tensor products on HE1 ⊗ HE2 to tensor products on
HX1⊗HX2 , and so is powerless to produce correlations between localized measurements X1 and X2 on these subspaces.
BK. Berkson’s rule:
Suppose neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose B is a
common descendant of X1, X2; then one generally expects them to be correlated conditional on B, i.e. that
P (X1X2|B) 6= P (X1|B)P (X2|B).
BK holds for quantum systems for essentially the same reasons as it did the classical case: conditioning on common
effects of independent variables typically renders them correlated. The only thing that changes in the quantum case
is that the induced ‘spurious correlations’ can be stronger than classical, i.e. they can exhibit entanglement, which
has been referred to as the “quantum Berkson effect” [16, 37].
Beyond these conditions, there are also some additional physical Markov conditions that are special to quantum
systems. The case of FCC has already been partially dealt with in Sec. IV A 3, but that analysis only pointed out
the existence of counterexamples in quantum mechanics. On the face of it, this seems to leave open the possibility
that FCC might nevertheless hold for any ‘typical’ quantum system. If so, we would have grounds to retain it.
To make this more precise, consider the case of a single common cause, X1 ← C → X2. Conditioning on C = c
effectively results in the preparation of an outgoing post-measurement state on the Hilbert space HC , which must
be a pure state |ψc〉 (because of condition (iii) in Sec. II C), and in fact in our formalism should correspond to a
member of a SIC-POVM, { 1dC Πc : c ∈ dom(C)}. For a particular value of C = c, the SIC-measurement can be
chosen such that the state |ψc〉 is arbitrary. The causal arrows mean that manipulations of this state can signal to
the measurements at X1 and X2, which implies that the system’s dynamics can be expressed as a quantum channel
T : HC 7→ HX1 ⊗HX2 which conveys information about |ψC〉 to each of X1 and X2, but is otherwise unconstrained.
The result is that the conditioned probabilities can be expressed as:
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P (X1, X2|C = c) = 1
d1d2
Tr [Πx1 ⊗Πx2 · ρc] ,
where ρc := T (|Πc〉〈Πc|). If we consider sampling T at random from the set of possible channels, this is equivalent
to letting ρc be a random sample from the set of all states (pure or mixed) on HX1 ⊗HX2 . We can then appeal to
the literature to point out that ‘typical’ quantum states are not only entangled, but are also ‘non-local’ in the sense
that they can violate Bell-type theorems (see eg. [38, 39]). This points not only to the rejection of FCC but to the
introduction of a new physical Markov condition that asserts the typicality of correlations conditional on common
causes:
BK*. Non-factorization on common causes (a.k.a. the causal inverse of Berkson’s rule):
Suppose neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared descendants, and suppose C is
a common ancestor of X1, X2; then one generally expects them to be correlated conditional on C, i.e. that
P (X1X2|C) 6= P (X1|C)P (X2|C) (Note: This condition is also named the causal inverse of Berkson’s rule, be-
cause it can be obtained from BK by switching the roles of ‘ancestors’ and ‘descendants’).
Here we begin to notice an interesting pattern. In the case of classical stochastic systems, there was a marked
asymmetry in the physical Markov conditions. The condition FCC (variables factorize conditional on common
causes) stood in opposition to BK (variables are correlated conditional on common effects). It is important to note
that the failure of the FCC does not by itself restore symmetry between these two principles. What is remarkable is
that quantum systems additionally satisfy the condition BK*, which we have noted is exactly the causal inverse of
BK. This points to the possibility that the quantum Markov conditions for quantum systems might have the property
of being causally symmetric. There remains, however, one obstacle: in order to attain full symmetry, the principle
RP must be paired with it’s causal inverse, namely:
RP*. Causal inverse of Reichenbach’s Principle:
If neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared descendants, then they are statistically indepen-
dent: P (X1X2) = P (X1)P (X2).
The main implication of this would be that X1, X2 should be statistically independent of each other, even if they
possess one or more common ancestors (but note that we do not condition on these ancestors). To understand what
it would mean for this to be true, consider again the simple case of a single common cause, X1 ← C → X2. Since
now we are not conditioning on C, its values in (28) must be summed over, leading to the probabilities:
P (X1, X2) =
∑
c
P (X1, X2|C = c)P (C = c)
=
∑
c
1
d1d2
Tr [Πx1 ⊗Πx2 · ρc]
1
dC
Tr [Πcρprep] , (28)
where P (C = c) = Tr [Πcρprep] is interpreted as the probability of obtaining C = c when doing a SIC-measurement
on the state ρprep, which represents the initial preparation step of the experiment (recall Sec. II C). From this we can
make the following observation. First, we define the quantum channel to be unbiased (using the terminology of Ref.
[40]) iff it preserves the maximally mixed state, i.e. T is unbiased iff T ( 1dC I) = 1d1d2 I. Now, if we restrict attention
to quantum systems initially prepared in the maximally mixed state 1dC I, and if we additionally assume that T is
unbiased, then we obtain:
P (X1, X2) =
∑
c
1
d1d2
Tr
[
Πx1 ⊗Πx2 ·
1
d1d2
I
]
1
d2C
=
1
d21d
2
2
= P (X1)P (X2) , (29)
and hence satisfies RP*. (In the companion work Ref. [41] this result is generalized to arbitrary causal struc-
tures). We therefore see that there exists a special sub-class of quantum systems, which (i) are prepared in the
maximally mixed state and (ii) evolve only through unbiased quantum channels, and for this sub-class, the condi-
tion RP* can be maintained. Let us call this sub-class the causally reversible quantum systems, for reasons that
will soon become clear. Within this sub-class, we can combine RP and RP* into the following more elegant condition:
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SRP. Symmetric Reichenbach Principle:
If neither of X1, X2 is a cause of the other, then they are statistically independent: P (X1X2) = P (X1)P (X2).
We mention, for completeness, that if we do choose to restrict attention to the causally reversible quantum systems,
then we cannot include the condition PI that was introduced as an optional extra for classical systems in Sec. III A.
This is because PI asserts that variables with shared causal ancestry must be typically correlated, which is flatly
contradicted by RP*.
What about the class of quantum systems in general – can we maintain PI for them? Here we enter into the
difficulties discussed by Price [19]. Briefly, recall that PI asserts that systems with common ancestry – which is not
conditioned upon – should typically be correlated. We have just seen that when common ancestors are conditioned
upon, then we typically get correlations: this was the motivation for the condition BK*. The problem with PI is
that it is impossible for us to imagine not conditioning on information about causal ancestors of the variables in the
system. This is because any experiment implies that we fix the values of numerous ‘background variables’, which are
not included as variables within the system, because they are not ‘variable’ at all. Formally, we could perhaps include
them as parents of the exogenous variables in the system, but their values are fixed by the very process of defining
the experiment, and thus are always implicitly conditioned upon. For example, in quantum mechanics, before we can
even begin to talk about an ‘atom’ or a ‘photon’ we have to carefully tune our source to produce the corresponding
phenomenon. This can be understood as a measurement, broadly representing the act of ‘checking that the source
is working’, and whose outcome we necessarily condition upoin in order to being the experiment: ‘yes, the source
is producing photons’. These pre-conditions of the experiment are always part of our knowledge, and can always in
principle be treated as conditioned causal ancestors of the other measurements in the experiment.
(Aside: Given this fact, one might be forgiven for wondering why the exogenous variables are not themselves
correlated with one another. The reason is essentially because the independence of exogenous variables is itself a
pre-condition for the experiment (Sec. II C). The choice of exogenous variables has to be carefully tailored to meet
this condition. We cannot apply the typicality argument BK* to them, because by definition they are not ‘typical’.
There is nothing surprising about this. Experiments do not just happen spontaneously by themselves in the normal
course of things (unless we are very lucky, or very patient)! Every experiment has a dual nature: it contains the
‘system’ which is supposed to unfold naturally under the given experimental conditions, but also the ‘experimental
conditions’ themselves which are carefully contrived to be quite unnatural and atypical.)
Behind each independent exogenous variable lies (implicitly) an experimental pre-condition that is fixed and con-
ditioned upon. Thus, two variables that are descended from the same exogenous variable (i.e. that have shared
ancestry) are implicitly already conditioned on that ancestry, and so we typically find them to be correlated. We now
see that this correlation can be attributed to BK*. However, we scientists often forget the ‘background conditions’
implicit in the experiment and so we mistakenly attribute the correlation to PI, thinking it to be due to the mere fact
of shared ancestry, without recognizing the essential role played by our own pre-existing knowledge that is implicitly
conditioned upon. In this manner, the supposed evidential basis for the condition PI may be called into question.
To be sure, it now becomes clear that the validity of PI depends on how we set-up and describe the experiment.
We may take the usual approach, in which the exogenous nodes of the system represent measurements on systems
in some defininte (or at least non-maximally mixed) states, these being the states obtained by some procedures that
take place outside the scope of the system, and that incorporate the background conditions of the experiment. In this
case, we can uphold the validity of PI, while keeping in mind that it is really just a manifestation of BK* within
some larger system.
On the other hand, this caveat implies that if we are maximally ignorant about the preparation – that is, if the
input states to the exogenous variables may be regarded as maximally mixed – then we have no reason to think that
PI would be upheld. On the contrary, as we have argued above, in this case we can consider the special class of
causally reversible quantum systems for which PI is replaced by RP*.
It is interesting to note that the classical stochastic systems cannot similarly be made symmetric by the rejection
of PI, because of the remaining asymmetry due to the opposition of the FCC and BK, as previously discussed. For
quantum systems, however, the fact that FCC no longer holds opens up the possibility of causal symmetry through
the postulation of RP* in place of PI. The resulting class of causally reversible quantum systems is so named because
it is defined by the set of physical Markov conditions {SSO, BK, BK*, SRP} which is invariant under switching of
the direction of causal arrows.
It must be emphasized that although the causally reversible quantum systems are a ‘sub-class’ of quantum systems,
in sense that they entail greater restrictions on the allowed initial states and dynamics, this does not mean that they
cannot describe all quantum phenomena.
To understand this, it is useful to take as a comparison the more familiar example of pure, unitary quantum systems,
which consists of systems prepared only in pure states, and subjected only to unitary dynamics. This is also a sub-class
of quantum systems in general, but due to Stinespring’s dilation theorem, we know that it is sufficient to describe
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any quantum behaviour with the help of ancillary systems. Moreover, despite the practical utility of non-unitary
and non-reversible quantum channels, it can be maintained that the principle unitarity and hence reversibility is a
fundamental characteristic of quantum mechanics. This may refer either to a metaphysical commitment to unitarity
at the fundamental level (as in Everettian interpretations) or else to the mere possibility of a unitary description as a
characteristic property of quantum systems. Either way, the apparent ‘restriction’ to unitary processes may also be
regarded as a move to illuminate a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics.
In the same way, since we are here concerned with the question of what fundamentally characterises quantum
systems, we need not be concerned by the fact that most practical experiments are not causally reversible. What
matters is that it is always possible to give a description of any quantum phenomenon in terms of a model that is
causally reversible. It is enough to note that it is possible to probabilistically prepare arbitrary pure states within the
class of causally reversible quantum systems, simply by performing (on the maximally mixed state) a SIC-measurement
having the desired pure state as a member, and then post-selecting on the corresponding outcome. It then follows that
the causally reversible quantum systems can simulate any behaviour from the class of pure, unitary quantum systems,
and thus any quantum behaviour at all, albeit with the requirement of more resources. Given this universality of the
causally reversible quantum systems, we will focus our attention on this class of systems in the remainder of this work,
because of their interesting property of causal reversibility.
E. The reversible Quantum Markov Condition
In this section, we extend the quantum Markov conditions for reversible quantum systems discussed in the previous
section to arbitrary causal structures. The graphical representation of the CMC (recall Section III A) suggests a way
to define an analogous Quantum Markov Condition starting from a graphical interpretation of the physical Markov
conditions SSO, BK, BK*, SRP. To this end, we postulate that the physical Markov conditions for quantum
systems with arbitrary causal structure are given by the following graphical condition:
QMC. Quantum Markov Condition (graphical version):
Let U,V,W be disjoint subsets of variables in a DAG G(X). A distribution P (X) is said to satisfy the Quantum
Markov Condition relative to G(X) iff P (UV|W) = P (U|W)P (V|W) holds whenever every path between U and V
is blocked by W. A path between two variables is said to be ‘blocked’ by the set W iff at least one of the following
conditions holds:
g-SSO: There is a chain A→ C → B along the path whose middle member C is in W;
g-BK: There is a collider A→ C ← B on the path where C is not in W and has no descendants in W.
g-BK*: There is a fork A← C → B on the path where C is not in W and has no ancestors in W.
(The reader may be wondering what happened to SRP. In fact, due to the subtle way that the Markov conditions
are converted into graphical rules, SRP is already implicit in both g-BK* and g-BK. To see this, note that if
SRP were false, then the graphical rules g-BK* and g-BK would be insufficient to indicate statistical independence.
For then it would be possible to have variables A,B such that neither is a cause of the other, and such that all
paths between them are blocked via the rules g-BK* and g-BK, and yet they are still correlated. What prevents
correlations in this case is precisely SRP. In more rigorous langage, the conditions BK, BK* only suggest that the
graphical rules g-BK* and g-BK are neccessary criteria for the path to be blocked, whereas SRP elevates them to
sufficient criteria.)
We remark that it is not clear whether this graphical definition of the QMC has an equivalent formulation as a
statement about the factorization of P (X) into a product of distributions, analogous to the form in which the CMC
was first expressed in Eq. (5). Whether such a form is possible, and what its precise form is, we leave to future work.
Note that in cases where latent variables are suspected, i.e. where the observed behaviour P (X) is suspected to be
only a marginal of an extended system with causal structure G(X,L), then we can use a weaker condition, analogous
to the classical CMC2:
QMC2. Quantum Markov Condition (with latent variables):
This condition is met iff there exists an extended distribution P (X,L), such that P (X,L) satisfies the QMC for the
causal structure of the system G(X,L), and P (X) is obtained from P (X,L) by marginalizing over the latent variables.
The above finally allows us to define a quantum causal model :
Quantum Causal Model:
A Quantum Causal Model consists of a pair {P (X), G(X)} where P (X) satisfies the Quantum Markov Condition and
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no fine-tuning for the DAG G(X).
In the next section, we take up the question of whether the fundamental postulate of causal modeling CS (see Sec.
II C) can be upheld for quantum systems.
F. Inference rules for quantum causal models
Classical causal models were characterized by two basic kinds of ideal measurements: the non-disturbing measure-
ments and interventions. In the case of quantum systems, there are again two basic types of measurements: the
SIC-measurements, and interventions, both of which are types of disturbing measurements. The interventions on
quantum systems have almost the same properties as their classical counterparts (as we will see in Sec. IV F. We
have seen that the SIC-measurements, unlike their classical counterparts, are now also disturbing measurements. This
disturbance manifests itself in a very particular way: it requires a special rule, the Urgleichung, to tell us what the
probabilities would have been if a SIC-measurement had not been performed on the system (recall Sec. IV B). In the
next subsection, we consider the details of how to generalize this rule to arbitrary causal structures.
1. The Urgleichung for arbitrary causal structures
The problem of un-performing a single ideal quantum measurement Z is to obtain the counterfactual behaviour
P (X|Z−) from the behaviour in the reference experiment, P (X, Z). It will be useful to partition X into the descen-
dants D and ancestors A of Z, and the rest R. Proceeding by analogy with the example of the causal chain (Sec.
IV B), we have:
P (X|Z−) := P (D,A,R|Z−)
= P (D|A,R, Z−)P (A,R|Z−)
= P (D|A,R, Z−)P (A,R|Z+) . (30)
where in the last step we appealed to counterfactual no-signalling CNS. At this point we would like to use the
Urgleichung to deal with the term P (D|A,R, Z−). How are we to do this?
For the QBist, the Urgleichung describes a relationship between the beliefs of a rational agent in two distinct
scenarios, one in which Z is performed (the RHS), and one in which it is not (the LHS). In either case, the agent is
assumed to have the same background information, which we refer to as past, and their beliefs are about the same set
of possible future measurement outcomes, which we call future. In this terminology, the Urgleichung can be written
in a more expressive form:
P (future|past, Z−) :=
∑
z
P (future|past, z)
[
(1 + d)P (z|past)− 1
d
]
, (31)
where it is of central importance to note that past refers to the personal past of the agent, and future refers to the
agent’s personal future. The measurement of Z represents a possible event that is about to happen (or not) in the
agent’s personal present, the consequences of which he is deliberating. (To be precise: he is about to learn the value
of CZ , and in the case that CZ = +, we may suppose that he simultanously learns the value of Z). If we assume
that the terms on the RHS are defined, that is, that the agent has definite beliefs about what would happen if Z is
measured, then the Urgleichung tells him what he ought rationally to expect if Z is not measured.
Now we meet the crux of the problem: in order to apply the Urgleiching to the term P (D|A,R, Z−), it appears we
must relegate R to the agent’s past, that is, to the set of information that has already reached him. However, taking
into account that the agent cannot be everywhere at once in space-time (he is not God, after all) it seems impossible
that information about all of R could have reached him in the moment before he learns about CZ . More rigorously,
regardless of the causal structure, one can always find an embedding of A,R,D in space-time such that there is no
localized space-time region S that satisfies all the following criteria: (i) the measurements D are all localized in the
future light cone of S; (ii) the measurements A are all localized in the past light cone of S; (iii) the measurements R
are all localized in either the future light cone or the past light cone of S. This also seems to show that we cannot
resolve the problem simply by splitting R into a ‘future’ part and a ‘past’ part.
Fortunately, this problem is overcome once we recognize that what determines an agent’s labelling of some mea-
surement as past or future is not directly a function of where the measurement actually takes place in space-time,
but rather depends on the time at which the agent became aware of the measurement [42]. To allocate the variables
their place in the agent’s experience, we have to consider what trajectory the agent takes through space-time. For
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simplicity, we assume that the agent becomes aware of a measurement event at the moment that a beam of light
reaches him from the event. The present is assigned to the very moment that the agent becomes aware of the
measurement or non-measurement of Z, that is, at the moment the agent’s world line intersects the future light cone
of the region where Z is supposed to take place (see Fig. 5 for an illustration).
FIG. 5. A space-time embedding of a causal model containing variables A,RA, Z,RD, D. The diagram shows how light beams
(dashed lines) provide a natural mapping from the partial ordering of the variables in space-time to a total ordering along the
world-line of a given observer (solid line at left), which enables us to extend the QBist ‘Urgleichung’ to relativistic space-time.
The star along the world line indicates the agent’s ‘present’, which divides their past from their future. Thus, relative to the
agent depicted, the measurements A,RA have already occurred, while Z,RD, D are anticipated to occur in their future.
The resolution of the problem now becomes clear. We may assume that each measurement is carried out automat-
ically by a machine or a scientist stationed in the corresponding space-time region, and the event is then broadcast
by telegram in all directions at the speed of light. The agent whose point of view we are assuming for the purposes of
applying the Urgleiching must now be assigned not just a space-time region centered around their present moment of
learning CZ , but also a past world-line through the experiment from which we can deduce which measurement events
the agent has already recorded. These are assigned to the agent’s past, and the remainder to the agent’s future.
This then provides a natural splitting of R into the set RA, of which the agent is already aware, and the remainder
RD of which he expects to learn later when their light reaches him. Revisiting Eq. 30, but now shifting RD to the
set that will correspond to the agent’s future, we obtain:
P (X|Z−) := P (D,A,RD,RA|Z−)
= P (D,RD|A,RA, Z−)P (A,RA|Z−)
= P (D,RD|A,RA, Z−)P (A,RA|Z+) , (32)
and we can now make the identification P (D,RD|A,RA, Z−) := P (future|past, Z−), which allows us to apply the
Urgleichung directly:
P (D,RD|A,RA, Z−) :=
∑
z
P (D,RD|A,RA, z)
[
(1 + d)P (z|A,RA)− 1
d
]
. (33)
The full inference rule is then obtained by substituting this into the last line of (32).
The question remains as to what should be the causal graph G(X) that holds for the counterfactual behaviour
P (X|Z−), when Z is not performed. An obvious constraint on the possible DAGs is that we require P (X|Z−)
to satisfy the QMC relative to G(X). A natural solution is obtained by making the assumption that the physical
process of ‘un-measuring’ Z – whatever it might mean in practice – should have the property that it preserves the
causal structure between all of the remaining variables, including the (former) parents and children of Z. This leads
to the following:
UNDAG. The DAG obtained on un-performing a measurement:
Let G(X, Z) represent the causal structure of a quantum system in the reference experiment, where Z is not an
exogenous node. Then the DAG conditional on un-performing Z, denoted G(X|Z−), is obtained from G(X, Z) by
the following procedure:
(i) Directly connecting every parent of Z to every child of Z;
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(ii) Deleting Z and its incoming and outgoing arrows.
It is natural to ask what conditional independences are implied by the QMC, after un-measuring Z. To obtain
the answer, it is sufficient to note that the removal of Z in the manner described in UNDAG cannot un-block any
path between variables that were previously blocked (unless they were blocked by Z) and it cannot block any path
that was previously un-blocked. This means that the conditional independences implied by the DAG G(X|Z−) after
the un-measurement are simply the set of conditional independences implied by the original DAG G(X, Z) excluding
those that involve Z. In Appendix B we prove that if P (X, Z) satisfies the QMC relative to G(X, Z), then P (X|Z−)
satisfies the QMC relative to the new DAG G(X) given by the above definition. The extension of these results
to the task of un-performing multiple measurements Z can be carried out by iterating the procedure for a single
measurement.
FIG. 6. The causal graph before and after un-performing the measurement Z; the causal pathways from its parents to its
children are preserved.
2. Interventions on quantum systems
In this section, we will define an ideal intervention on a quantum system, following the classical definition as closely
as possible. The key features of an ideal intervention are that it is localized as much as possible to the region of the
intervened-upon variable, and that it completely breaks the causal dependence of this variable on its parents in the
reference experiment. As is done elsewhere in the literature, we interpret the intervention as a process that effectively
discards the prior state of the local subsystem and re-prepares it in an arbitrary new state chosen by the experimenter,
represented by the control variable.
Formally, we represent an intervention on the variable W ∈ X by introducing an associated control variable CW ,
with dom(CW ) = {dom(W ),}, where ‘’ represents the ‘idle’ case of no intervention. P (X|CW , CW+) represents
the behavior of the system in a counterfactual experiment in which the variable W is intervened upon and its value
is set as equal to the value of CW , i.e. W = c, with c 6= . Since an intervention disturbs the system, part of its
definition must specify how the causal structure of the system is affected: for this purpose we introduce G(X, CW )
as the causal structure of the system resulting from the intervention. Like all active manipulations, interventions
satisfy externality and counterfactual no-signalling (recall Sec. II E). In addition, interventions on quantum systems
are assumed to satisfy NPE (recall Sec. III B). So far, there is no difference between the quantum and classical
definitions of an intervention, and indeed we may follow identical reasoning as in the classical case (Sec. III B) to
obtain the first inference rule for interventions on quantum systems, which we repeat here for convenience:
QIR1. For quantum systems, the causal structure after the intervention, G(X, CW ), should be obtained from
G(X) by deleting all incoming arrows to W and then introducing CW as the sole parent of W (see Fig. 3).
However, turning to the inference rule needed for obtaining P (X|CW , CW+), we encounter a serious challenge.
In the classical case, the inference rule for interventions was given by Eq. (16), whose justification depended on
the validity of the CMC. Since the latter has now been replaced by the QMC, the existence of an inference rule
is no longer guaranteed. In fact, as we will now demonstrate, an inference rule for quantum systems that yields
P (X|CW , CW+) purely from {P (X), G(X)} does not exist in general!
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This can be illustrated most effectively by considering the counterexample given by the causal structure shown
in Fig. 7 (a). The circuit diagram shown in Fig. 7 (b) represents a possible realization of this system, based on a
partitioning of the system’s Hilbert space into Hsys = H1 ⊗H2.
FIG. 7. (a) a causal diagram and (b) one of the possible quantum circuits that it could represent (cf Sec. IV C ). In the circuit,
thick arrows represent quantum systems and thin arrows represent classical data. The boxes with meters on them represent
non-destructive SIC-measurements. The system on the left corresponds to the space H1 and the system on the right to H2.
The classical systems represent the outputs of the circuit (the variables A,D,W ) while the quantum systems are discarded at
the end. As explained in the text, the result of an intervention on W in this circuit will in general depend on the choice of
unitaries U ,V.
The result of an intervention CW on W would produce probabilities given by:
P (A,D,W |CW , CW+) = Tr
[(
Π
(1)
W ⊗ ρ(2)A
)
E
(1,2)
D
]
δ(W,CW ) , (34)
where ρ
(2)
A := Tr1
[
ρ
(1,2)
A
]
is the reduced state on H2, obtained by taking the partial trace of the total state of the
system ρ
(1,2)
A just prior to W , and where E
(1,2)
D represents the POVM element U
(
I(1) ⊗Π(2)D
)
U† corresponding to
the measurement of D after propagation thorough U . Thus, to compute the effect of an intervention on W , it would
be necessary to reconstruct both ρ
(2)
A and E
(1,2)
D from the probabilities P (A,D,W ) in the reference experiment, but
this is clearly impossible without knowing which unitaries U ,V were applied in the underlying circuit.
Therefore, in this example, the causal model {P (A,D,W ), G(A,D,W )} is not sufficient to deduce what would
happen under an intervention; more information is needed than just these probabilities and the causal structure.
This violates the postulate of causal sufficiency CS, which was presented in Sec. II C. We recall that CS is a key
component of the relativist formulation of causal modeling, because it enables us to interpret causality as purely a
relation between an observer’s probabilitiy asignments to different experiments. If we have to depend upon some
kind of fixed external structure like a quantum circuit or quantum process matrix in order to make inferences about
counterfactuals, then we are compelled to follow the causal realist in regarding causal structure as simply the structure
of this quantum process. At least, without CS, the relativist view seems more like an unneccessary complication of
the concept of causality than a simplification of it.
It is natural to wonder whether the problem might be overcome by considering other types of informationally-
complete measurements besides SIC measurements. However, we soon find that the obstacle goes much deeper: it
lies in the very concept of a reference experiment. Recall that the reference experiment is defined as a fixed set
of measurement instruments, from whose statistics it is hoped to reconstruct the results of arbitrary interventions,
or equivalently, to fully reconstruct an object like a quantum process matrix from which interventions can then be
obtained. But it is well-known that such process tomography is impossible with only a fixed set of measurements, even
if they are informationally-complete on the Hilbert space of their input systems. This fact is sometimes expressed
as the impossibility of full quantum process tomography without interventions [17, 43]. But according to CS, the
possibility of making inferences about interventions from a given fixed set of reference measurements is exactly what
the relativist requires. If the reference experiment is insufficient for causal inference, then our whole program fails.
Is there any way to rescue the relativist interpretation from this bind? We will now argue that there is a way out,
but it depends on a somewhat radical premise. If we wish to insist that CS is upheld, we must impose a restriction
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on the set of valid causal structures that can appear in the reference experiment. On this view, the example of
Fig. 7 need not represent a failure of CS, but rather indicates that the example does not describe a valid reference
experiment for the system. What would be the correct reference experiment for the circuit of Fig. 7 (b)? Consider
the causal graph shown in Fig. 8 (a) and corresponding circuit shown in Fig. 8 (b). It is exactly the same circuit as
that shown in Fig. 7, except that an extra SIC-measurement Z has now been introduced on H2.
FIG. 8. (a) a causal graph and (b) a corresponding quantum circuit, similar to that shown in Fig. 7, except with an additional
SIC-measurement Z performed on system 2. In contrast to that case, the result of an intervention on W (or on Z) in this
circuit can be deduced directly from the reference probabilities P (A,D,W,Z) without having to make direct reference to the
choice of unitaries U ,V. This enables us to perform causal inference without needing to know the details of the unitaries in the
circuit.
In this example, the conflict with CS does not arise: since the tensor product of two SIC-POVMs is an
informationally-complete POVM, the statistics P (A,D,W,Z) now are sufficient to reconstruct both ρ
(2)
A and E
(1,2)
D ,
implying that it ought to be possible to define an inference rule to compute P (A,D,W |CW , CW+) using only the
causal model of the reference experiment. From this example, we can extrapolate a general class of DAGs for which
this solution is expected to work:
LDAG. Layered DAG. A DAG for a set of variables X := {Xi} is said to be a layered DAG or LDAG iff for
every node Xi there exists a set of variables containing Xi called a ‘layer’, denoted Li, such that no member of
the layer is a cause of any other member, and such that any path from an ancestor of Xi to a descendant of Xi is
intercepted by at least one member of the layer Li, i.e. it contains a causal chain A→ B → C whose middle member
B is in Li.
We will now prove that, for any LDAG, there is an inference rule that can be used to obtain the probabilities
under intervention, P (A,D,W |CW , CW+), using only those of the reference experiment, P (A,D,W ) plus the causal
structure.
First, consider the quantum causal model {P (X), G(X)} where G(X) is now assumed to be a LDAG. Let L be
the members (other than W ) of the layer containing the to-be-intervened-upon node W . The nodes R can then
be subdivided according to whether they causally precede or follow the layer: let RD be the subset of R that are
descendants of L and let RA be the subset that are ancestors of L. (Note that we are abusing notation here – the
partitioning of R into RA, RD is here determined by the structure of the LDAG itself, and not by the order in which
an observer expects to encounter them, as was the case in Sec. IV F 1.)
As already discussed, the post-intervention DAG G(X, CW ) is obtained from G(X) by deleting the incoming arrows
to W and introducing CW as its sole parent – note that the resulting graph is automatically also a LDAG. As we did
for the classical case, we will derive the inference rule by postulating that the post-intervention probabilities satisfy
the QMC relative to the new graph. This implies that the following conditional independence must hold:
P (D,RD|W,L,A,RA, CW , CW+) = P (D,RD|W,L, CW+) , (35)
which is simply a consequence of applying g-SSO to the new LDAG. Another (less obvious) conditional independence
implied by the QMC is:
P (L,A,RA|CW , CW+) = P (L,A,RA|CW+) , (36)
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which follows from the fact that, since CW has no ancestors in the intervened graph, and W has no ancestors other
than CW , every path connecting CW to any member of L,A,RA must contain a collider A→ C ← B whose middle
member C is in D. Hence as long as we do not condition on D, the rule g-BK implies that L,A,RA must be
independent of CW , which is just what (36) says. Using these results, we obtain:
P (X|CW , CW+) = P (D,RD,W,L,A,RA|CW , , CW+)
= P (D,RD|W,L,A,RA, CW , CW+)P (W |L,A,RA, CW , CW+)P (L,A,RA|CW , CW+)
= P (D,RD|W,L, CW+) δ(W,CW )P (L,A,RA|CW+)
= P (D,RD|W,L) δ(W,CW )P (L,A,RA) . (37)
To obtain the third line in the above calculation we made use of the relations (35), (36) and the fact that W is set
equal to the value of the control variable CW . To obtain the last line we made use of CNS and NPE. In the final
line, all the terms on the RHS refer to probabilities in the reference experiment. Thus, Eq. (37) defines the inference
rule for interventions on quantum systems whose causal structure is given by a LDAG, namely:
QIR2. For quantum systems, the behaviour in a counterfactual experiment where an intervention CW is performed
on W is given by:
P (X|CW , CW+) = δ(W,CW )P (D,RD|W,L)P (L,A,RA) . (38)
For multiple interventions, this rule can simply be iterated. Thus, provided that we can always design the reference
experiment such that the causal structure of the system is a LDAG, then we can uphold CS and hence retain a
relativist interpretation of causality. It is a notable feature of the above derivation that it was made based purely on
general causal principles, without appealing to any particular underlying model of a quantum process. Indeed, that
is the great strength of the relativist approach to causality: by focusing on causal relations purel at the probabilistic
level, we do not need to commit to any particular mathematical representation of quantum processes.
Strictly speaking, we have only shown that the restriction to LDAGs is sufficient for causal inference to be possible,
but we have not established it as a necessary condition. To do so would require us to show that there exist quantum
processes that cannot be fully tomographed if the DAG is not a LDAG. To prove that would require working with
some particular formal representation of quantum processes. In a companion work Ref. [41], we prove that the LDAG
is also a neccessary condition for full tomography, in the context of the process matrix formalism for quantum causal
models of Ref. [13].
It might be questioned whether quantum systems can always be made to conform to a LDAG by adding measure-
ments to the reference experiment. Extrapolating beyond the simple examples of Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, there seems to
be no fundamental obstacle to this assumption. Problems might conceivably arise if the system contains degrees of
freedom that cannot be measured in principle, or if part of the system is located inside a space-time region that is
inaccessible to measurements, such as behind a horizon or inside a black hole. Needless to say, one would have to
look far beyond the regime of common laboratory experiments to find such examples, but it remains an interesting
theoretical question whether it is possible to extend CS to these situations. We leave this open to future investigation.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Relevance to quantum Markovianity
The present work was written in the midst of recent efforts to consolidate a unified framework for quantum ‘Marko-
vian’ dynamics [11–13]. A natural question is whether the definition of a quantum causal model presented here is
consistent with these works.
First it must be pointed out that, following the dominant trend, these works are primarily concerned with defining
Markovianity as a property of process tensors [12] or process matrices [13]. By contrast, for reasons already discussed,
the present work focuses entirely on how to describe quantum dynamics at the level of probabilities, hence our definition
of the QMC only applies to probabilities. Nevertheless, our model was explicitly constructed to be consistent with
any valid abstract representation of quantum processes, and so we expect there to be a link between our definitions
and those promoted in the literature.
We immediately note that the assumption of an LDAG and the condition SSO (from the QMC) together imply
that for any layer Li in a quantum causal model {P (X), G(X)} with X = L1,L2, ...,LN , we must have:
P (Li|Li−1,Li−2, ...,L1) = P (Li|Li−1) , (39)
which is essentially identical to the definition of a classical Markov process, except that the measurements Li do not
necessarily occur simultaneously at a single time-step. Rather, the relevant notion of ordering in our case is not given
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by ‘time-steps’ but by the more general notion of the causal ordering of layers in the LDAG. This enables us to apply
the Corollary in Ref. [12] to deduce that any representation of our quantum causal model in terms of process tensors
will necessarily result in a process tensor that is Markovian by the definition of that work, at least with regards to
measurements and interventions performed on entire layers.
For more general causal structures, the work of Ref. [13] has defined a quantum Markov condition on quantum
process matrices. We have every reason to expect that our QMC, while defined at the probabilistic level, is in
principle compatible with the quantum Markov condition on process matrices proposed in Ref. [13], provided that we
restricts all measurements in their framework to be SIC-measurements. This raises the interesting question of how
the property of being causally reversible in our formalism translates into constraints on the allowed process matrices
that characterize causally reversible quantum systems. This connection is explored in the companion work, Ref. [41].
B. Symmetry under causal inversion
The following result is apparent from inspection of the QMC (cf Sec. IV E):
Causal inversion symmetry: Suppose that P (X) satisfies the QMC relative to a DAG G(X). Let G∗(X) be
the DAG obtained from G(X) by reversing the directions of all arrows. Then P (X) also satisfies the QMC relative
to G∗(X).
At first glance, this property of quantum causal models might seem to be a weakness as it implies that, without
any a-priori information about the causal ordering (such as the time-stamps of measurements), it is not possible to
deduce the overall direction of causality in a system X just by examining the reference behaviour P (X). On the other
hand, the reference behaviour is supposed to capture the maximum of information about counterfactual experiments
including interventions, and these latter seem to reveal the actual direction of causality in the system. Thus, if
we believe the direction of causality to be an intrinsic property of the system, we must conclude that the reference
behaviour is not maximally informative about counterfactuals, and hence the causal model is flawed.
But is this information about a causal direction (the direction of influence by interventions) “really there in the
system”, waiting to be revealed? It is important to clarify what is at stake here. If the direction of cause and effect
is already fixed within the system prior to any interventions made upon it, then there is a certain sense in which A
is a cause of B in a system prior to any attempt to physically manipulate A or B, and this is tantamount to taking
a realist view of causality.
A causal relativist would say that, on the contrary, the question of whether A is a cause of B or the other way
around depends on the relative situation of the system to the observer. We readily admit that this relation is as good
as objective: if the observer performs an intervention on the system and find that A causes B, then it is not within
that same observer’s powers to bring about B as the cause of A.
What sort of constraints might be responsible for determining the direction of causality that we (as a particular
class of observers) see when we perform interventions? It was emphasized by Price [19] that it is characteristic of
observers (such as ourselves) that we have access only to that information that can be recorded by us, and our records
refer to our own past, and not to our future. There is thus a real asymmetry in our memories and records that may
be taken to be a property of how we, as physical systems, are embedded in space and time. No matter how hard
we try, we cannot change the fact that information in one direction of time is accessible to us (via physical records)
while information in the other direction is not (the future is ‘open’). This feature of ourselves is what grounds our
experience of the direction of causality. It might be that a causal relation is intrinsic to a system only in the form of
a pure, symmetric correlation between its properties, and that it is our own orientation as observers that forces us to
‘traverse’ the correlation only in one direction, such that the consequences of our interventions lie in our own future.
On this view, the direction of causality is not so much a relative property of observer and system, but is rather an
intrinsic property of the observer that the system merely reflects.
It is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate on what constitutes an ‘observer’ or what would be the appropriate
physical description of an intervention as a physical process between an observer and a system. However, it is a
significant feature of the present model that it explicitly allows for such possibilities, whereas a realist interpretation
of causality excludes any possible observer-dependence of the direction of causal influence. Whether one should choose
G(X) or G∗(X) as the DAG prior to intervention is not a piece of information given by the system itself, but rather
depends on what relation we have to the system as physical observers, that is, it depend on which graph accurately
predicts what a given observer would see if she were to interact with the system.
It is interesting to note that other authors, following different lines of inquiry, have reached similar conclusions.
In Ref. [14], it was argued that the distinction between ‘states’ and ‘effects’ in the formalism of quantum theory is
entirely conventional, as it depends on how one defines ‘physical operations’. The authors showed that by extending
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the notion of physical operations, quantum theory could be regarded as perfectly symmetric in time (hence also in
causality). Similarly, in Ref. [44], the authors found it necessary to postulate a ‘causal reference frame’ associated
to an observer, which defines “an observer-dependent time according to which an observer describes the evolution
of quantum systems”. It would be an interesting project to unify these perspectives within a model of quantum
mechanics that is not only time-symmetric but is also symmetric under causal interventions.
C. Directions for future work
In the introduction, it was pointed out that the failure of CMC for quantum systems (particularly FCC) removes
the classical bounds on correlations, for example, in the bipartite case, the bounds described as Bell inequalities.
Quantum causal models therefore tend to lack the essential feature that the causal stucture determines the bounds
on the strength of correlations (where ‘strength’ means eg. the amount by which classical bounds on inequalities are
violated). The close connection between correlations and causality that existed in the classical case seems to be lost
when we pass to quantum systems, and the origin of the quantum bounds becomes much more mysterious.
In the framework presented here, we considered a formulation of quantum theory purely in terms of the probabilities
that would be obtained under SIC-measurements. Recent efforts by the QBists have shown that a great deal of
the Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics can be derived purely from the probability structure of SIC-
measurements. This gives us some hope that it might be possible to re-establish a direct link between correlations
and causal structure by leveraging the mathematical properties of SIC measurements in general causal scenarios. A
first step would be to show that Tsirelson’s bound can be derived purely from the structure of probabilities in the
Bell scenario, using our quantum causal model. This is left to future work.
In Sec. IV A 2 we briefly discussed whether the quantum measurements appearing in the reference experiment could
be classified as passive observations, despite the fact of being disturbing measurements. In the present work, we have
opted not to do so, in order to avoid the complexities that this would entail. However, there are potentially some
advantages to doing so. Ried et. al. [31] have argued that quantum measurements can (under the right conditions)
be treated as ‘passive’ so as to place them in direct analogy with classical passive observations. This allows one to
make a direct comparison between classical and quantum causal models in terms of their ability to perform causal
inference, under the constraints of ‘passive’ observation. On this basis, Ref. [31] claimed a quantum advantage for
causal inference.
It must be emphasized that any claimed advantage for causal inference of quantum systems over classical systems
requires that both systems be restricted to only ‘passive observations’ and therefore the claim depends crucially on the
justification as to why certain informative quantum measurements can be regarded as ‘passive’. Any such justification
is likely to have to appeal to some metaphysical or philosophical point of view in order to establish that the change
of quantum state is in no way comparable to any kind of intervention (if it were, then the comparison to classical
passive observation would be inappropriate, and the quantum advantage would be meaningless). As pointed out in
Ref. [30], the criterion of ‘passive observation’ used by Ried. et. al. in Ref. [31] can be challenged on a number of
points. It therefore remains an interesting open problem whether a quantum advantage for causal inference can be
decisively established.
Another reason why it would be useful to define a notion of ‘passive’ quantum measurements is that it would
provide a means of separating the observer-dependent from the observer-independent properties of a system under
observation. It may be argued, for instance, that the properties detectable through passive observation must be
‘objective’ insofar as they are invariant under changes of the observer. Thus, for instance, it would be possible to
argue that the causal symmetry of our present definition of a quantum causal model is indicative of a deeper observer-
independent symmetry of physical laws, rather than being merely an accidental feature of the class of systems we
have chosen to study. In the companion work Ref. [41], we attempt to make exactly this argument, by proposing a
definition of ‘passive observations’ that encompasses IC-measurements and restricting the causal structure to LDAGs
as we have done here.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Science is primarily concerned with the acquisition of knowledge about the world, but in order to achieve this role
it must also be concerned with understanding the limitations on how such knowledge can be acquired. This comes
about because of the charming quasi-circularity of scientific enquiry: first, one investigates nature using instruments
whose workings are well-understood; then, having fixed the natural theory, one turns it inwards to the instruments
themselves and uses it to build more accurate instruments, which can then be used to repeat the process, leading to
an ever more accurate and intimate connection between ourselves and nature.
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The reflective move of turning our theories of the world onto ourselves is captured by the opening quotation of
David Hume – the idea that insofar as science is able to make deductions about the world, it must also be a study
of our place in the world, and the limitations of what is knowable to us. The relativist approach to causality that
we have endorsed here argues that causality is not entirely independent of our own physical situation and role as
observers.
On a manipulationist interpretation of causality, one is concerned with the information available to an observer
prior to performing ‘manipulations’ on the system, this information being represented in the form of probability
distributions describing what would be observed under the various counterfactual conditions. From this point of view,
the causal relata should be maximally informative about counterfactuals, hence informationally complete, and this
leads naturally to the idea of SIC-measurements as the elementary causal relata in a quantum system. From the
properties of SIC-measurements, one is led naturally to a quantum version of the Causal Markov Condition, which
turns out to be symmetric under causal inversion. If we reject the realist presumption that this symmetry represents
mere ignorance of an underlying causal orientation, then we arrive at the relativist notion that the asymmetry of cause
and effect is introduced at the moment that an observer interacts with a system by performing an manipulation on
it (for quantum systems, this would be either an intervention or an un-measurement). Thus, we are led to conclude
that the direction of cause and effect in quantum mechanics is somehow dependent on the physics of the interaction
between the observing and the observed systems. The precise nature of this inferred dependence is left as an open
topic for future research.
Whereas other quantum (and classical) causal models in the literature have tended to favour a realist view (as
we argued in the introduction), the present model favours a relativist view of causality. Furthermore, it indicates
that causal structure might well be reconcilable with the time-symmetry (CPT-invariance) of the fundamental laws
of physics, since it suggests that causal orientation is not a fundamental property of a system, but rather describes
the contingent relation between the system and an observer.
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Appendix A: Violation of SSO in quantum systems
The goal is to prove that P (A,C|B) = P (A|B)P (C|B) is guaranteed only if the state conditioned on B is pure.
The state after preparing ρA and measuring B may be written as:
ρb(A) :=
Eb(ρA)
Tr [Eb(ρA)] , (A1)
where Eb is a completely positive linear map that depends on the outcome B = b. Clearly it will be possible to find a
measurement C whose outcome is correlated with A iff ρb(A) has a dependence on A. From the above equation, for
generic ρA, the absence of such dependence can only be guaranteed if Eb has the form:
Eb(ρA) := Tr [Eb(ρA)] ρ(b) (A2)
where ρ(b) is a state that can only depend on the value of b. If this state is mixed, it can be written as a convex
combination of pure states, ρ(b) =
∑
i
λi |ψi(b)〉〈ψi(b)|,
∑
i
λi = 1. Therefore it can be implemented by performing
a measurement whose post-measurement states correspond to the {|ψi(b)〉〈ψi(b)|} and discarding the value of i – but
this would violate property (iii) desirable of ideal measurements. To fulfill this property, then, ρ(b) must be pure.
Appendix B: The model that results from un-performing a measurement
Here we prove the statement in Sec. IV F 1 that if P (X, Z) satisfies the QMC relative to G(X, Z), then P (X|Z−)
satisfies the QMC relative to the new DAG G(X) given by the definition UNDAG. From Eq. 33 we can write:
P (X|Z−) = P (D,RD|A,RA, Z−)P (A,RA|Z−)
=
∑
z
P (D,RD|A,RA, z, Z+)Q(z|A,RA)P (A,RA|Z+) , (B1)
where for convenience we have defined:
Q(z|A,RA) := (1 + d)P (z|A,RA, Z+)− 1
d
. (B2)
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Written in this form, we see that P (X|Z−) can be expressed as the result of marginalizing over Z in a distribu-
tion with the form given on the RHS in the last line of Eq. (B1). Since marginalizing over Z cannot eliminate
conditional independences that do not involve Z, any conditional independences on the RHS not involving Z will
be present in P (X|Z−). Since the conditional independences implied by G(X|Z−) (using the QMC) are pre-
cisely those implied by G(X, Z) excluding the ones containing Z, we only need to show that all terms on the RHS
satisfy the conditional independences implied by G(X, Z). That this is true can be verified by inspection: the
terms P (D,RD|A,RA, z, Z+), P (A,RA|Z+) satisfy the QMC relative to G(X, Z) by assumption, and the term
Q(z|A,RA) must do so because P (z|A,RA, Z+) does, and the mapping of Eq. (B2) preserves conditional inde-
pendences (it is merely a constant rescaling and displacement of the distribution). This completes the proof of the
claim.
